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ABSTRACT 
The majority of municipal law enforcement agencies in the United States are not 
proactively contributing to America’s homeland security, counterterrorism or domestic 
intelligence efforts.  These agencies – the country’s most critical domestic security assets 
– sit idle on the homeland security sidelines as terrorism becomes increasingly prolific, 
lethal, asymmetric, transnational, and closer to our hometowns.  
Seven years after 9/11, there is no nationwide, municipal-level network of 
homeland security professionals across the United States.  There is no preventative-
based, forward-thinking system for domestic intelligence collection.  And, the vast 
majority of police departments lack homeland security or terrorism specialists.  
Furthermore, neither federal nor state strategy has clearly defined specific homeland 
security roles and responsibilities for municipal police departments.   
And, as of this writing, there is no municipal-level homeland security strategy.  
Most importantly, no realistic federal or state strategy has been put forth that integrates 
all of America’s homeland security assets—including municipal police officers - into a 
single synergistic design.   
This thesis examines three policy options and arrives at a conclusion as to which 
option America should implement to effectively protect our citizenry from terrorists.  
This thesis introduces the concept of “municipal homeland security” and defines the 
specific roles and responsibilities of municipal police agencies. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
“Today, our nation is safer, but we’re not yet safe”1  Consider this: The majority 
of municipal law enforcement officers in the United States are not proactively 
contributing to America’s homeland security, counterterrorism or domestic intelligence 
efforts.  These officers – the country’s most critical domestic security assets – sit idle on 
the homeland security sidelines as terrorism becomes increasingly prolific, lethal, 
asymmetric, transnational, and closer to our hometowns.  
Today, more than seven years after 9/11, there is no municipal-level network of 
homeland security professionals, no preventative-based forward-thinking system for 
domestic intelligence collection, few homeland security or terrorism specialists in the 
majority of police departments, and most importantly, no (realistic) strategy to integrate 
all of America’s homeland security assets into a single synergistic design that is based 
upon the local community.  The federal government continues to emphasize a decidedly 
federal approach to homeland security. 
On 9/11, the American public witnessed a new phenomenon – transnational 
religious fanaticism expressed through the synchronized exploitation of a modern 
network, specifically the transportation network.  On that day, al Qaeda (an asymmetric 
threat) deliberately and successfully attacked the United States of America by converting 
commercial airplanes into weapons of mass destruction.  And, they intend to strike us 
again “…and just as you lay waste to our nation, so shall we lay waste to yours” 2  
The events of 9/11 caused an epiphany in America’s government, intelligence, 
military and law enforcement communities.  Following the attacks, leaders in each of 
these critical areas became engrossed in self-evaluation as they rushed to create new 
                                                 
1 National Strategy for Homeland Security, October 5, 2007, President’s Letter, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeland/nshs/2007/letter.html (accessed November 17, 2008). 
2 Gillis Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, Al Qaeda in its Own Words (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2008).  
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intelligence, defense, and law enforcement strategies independently.  Subsequently, new 
and innovative legislation was enacted, new governmental agencies emerged, major 
reorganizations of existing government agencies transpired, thousands of homeland 
security workers were hired, new intelligence protocols were established and the law 
enforcement community took on new responsibilities.  These were significant 
undertakings in our American society.  Yet, no individual, public official or government 
agency – at any level of government – has formalized a national plan that fully integrates 
municipalities and the municipal law enforcement community into the country’s 
homeland security strategy.  America has both national and state homeland security 
strategies, but lacks a critical component – a municipal-level homeland security strategy.  
As a result, a false sense of security exists within America, as our communities 
are needlessly exposed to transnational and domestic terrorists and other malcontents.  
This deplorable and completely unacceptable state of homeland security does not stem 
from the problems of a decentralized police profession or the lack of federal guidance 
alone, but rather from a number of mutually supporting factors.  These factors are:   
1. The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) Lacks 
Specificity 
The NSHS lacks specificity for the municipal police community.  The NSHS, as it 
currently exists, is primarily a broad, overarching federal strategy rather than a 
comprehensive national strategy.  The role of municipal police agencies in the NSHS (or 
any national strategy) is not clearly identified and defined; subsequently little federal 
guidance is provided to municipal police leaders as to how their agencies can integrate 
and proactively participate in America’s domestic security.   
2.   The American Way of Policing Is Decentralized 
America is a federated republic; every state is entitled to establish its own 
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government.  This same autonomy exists 
within the American way of policing.  Across the United States there are approximately 
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17,876 police agencies representing approximately 836,737 sworn officers.3  The 
“current system of policing is individualized, fragmented and disconnected”4  In 
America, there is a “… multitude of police forces in any state and the varying standards 
of organization and services have contributed immeasurably to the general low grade of 
police performance in this country”5  The decentralization of American policing makes it 
difficult for implementation of a comprehensive domestic security strategy.  
Subsequently, the majority of police executives continue to operate their departments as 
they see fit, largely ignoring the needs of modern America.  
3.   Emerging Anti-Terrorism Programs Compound and Continue the 
Decentralization Problem 
In the days following September 11, some local anti-terrorism efforts began to 
slowly emerge, primarily due to an information, resource and guidance void that was not 
filled by federal and state governments.  As the more proactive police leaders realized 
they were largely on their own, the need for self-protection became apparent.  
Subsequently, various anti-terrorism programs were created, each a little different from 
the other, but all designed to accomplish one goal – to protect only the individual 
community.  
The emergence of individualized anti-terrorism programs (in some cases 
homeland security programs) compounds the problem of decentralization and creates 
further discontinuity and fragmentation within America’s homeland security strategy.  
When numerous local homeland security programs are formed – and more will be formed 
after the next attack on the homeland – we continue and compound these problems, 
thereby limiting our own ability to protect ourselves.   
                                                 
3 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics website, 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm (accessed October 15, 2008).  
4 Christopher Vicino, Building a Better Mouse Trap: Increasing Counterterrroism Capabilities 
through Consolidation, (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, U.S. Center for Homeland Defense 
and Security, Monterey, California 2006). 
5 National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement. Wickersham Report (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933). 
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Without a unifying collaborative approach to homeland security, we are destined 
to repeat the failures experienced in the war on drugs.  According to the U.S. Conference 
of Mayors “Drug-related crimes were cited most frequently by the survey cities as their 
single biggest crime problem”6  At the municipal level, America’s approach to combat 
drugs is similar to the approach being used to combat terrorism.  In the war on drugs, 
every municipal police department is free to develop (or not develop) its own anti-drug 
strategy.  Like the homeland security strategy, there is no unifying national drug strategy.  
Subsequently, the illegal drug trade flourishes in America as illegal drugs saturate every 
aspect of our society.  In the war on drugs, a decentralized approach has proven 
disastrous – we need not make the same mistake in homeland security.  Without a 
unifying national plan, drug dealers and terrorists propagate.   
4.  Long-Standing Methodologies and Practices Remain Prominent 
The lack of federal guidance – compounded by the propensity of many municipal 
police chiefs to accept the status quo – creates an atmosphere where long-standing 
practices and methodologies are memorialized.  Most police departments cling to 
traditional policing models that are decentralized and reactive, not proactive; consider 
response a priority, not prevention; and fail to address 21st century threats such as 
asymmetric terrorism.  Why upset the apple cart?  Especially when the department is 
operating relatively smoothly and the community appears secure from terrorists.   
These police leaders do not fully comprehend the threat of terrorism or the 
significant positions their agencies can occupy in America’s homeland security strategy.  
They continue to go about their daily lives, concentrating on traditional crime, as if they – 
and their communities – are uniquely immune from terrorists and their lethal schemes.   
                                                 
6 The United States Conference of Mayors, 2008 Economic Downturn and Federal Inaction Impact on 
Crime, Philadelphia (August 6, 2008), www.usmayors.org/maf/documents/CrimeReport_0808.pdf 
(accessed November 17, 2008). 
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5.   Terrorism Is Not Perceived As a Real Threat 
Most in the law enforcement community have neither lived in a society where 
terrorism occurs frequently, nor have they ever been exposed to terrorism.  Many police 
leaders were born, raised, attended school and now raise their own families in the 
communities where they are employed.  Terrorism is not real to these officers.  It is the 
old “it could never happen here” adage.  Terrorism will not be taken seriously until 
municipal police officers understand the dynamics of terrorism and that terrorism is a 
viable threat to their community. 
6. There are Three Levels of Government and Two Levels of Homeland 
Security Strategy 
In the United States, there is both national and state homeland security strategy.  
However, there is no municipal-level homeland security strategy.  National strategy 
broadly focuses on guiding and unifying our nation’s homeland security assets.7  State 
strategy concentrates on a state’s plan to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism.8  The 
missing component is a foundational level of homeland strategy that is specific to 
municipalities.   
The lack of municipal homeland security strategy leaves many municipalities 
vulnerable and open to attack.   
7.   The Municipal Homeland Security Mission Is Not Widely Accepted 
The majority of police agencies in America do not have anyone assigned (either 
in a full-time or part-time basis) to homeland security or antiterrorism duties.  There are 
few police specialists in these two important fields.  In most departments, no one is 
specifically trained to recognize terrorism indicators or investigate terrorism-related 
incidents.  In addition, no one is proactively scouring police reports, public documents, or 
                                                 
7 See the version for more information regarding national homeland security direction. The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security, 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book (accessed November 
17, 2008). 
8 California State Homeland Security Strategy, 2007, 
www.homeland.ca.gov/pdf/2008_CA_State_Homeland_Security_Strategy (accessed November 1, 2008). 
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the community for information that could be utilized to better secure their community.  
Relationships with federal and state terrorism officers are not routinely established, 
community anti-terrorism partnerships are not being created, and managers of 
infrastructure are still on their own when it comes to securing their facilities against 
terrorists.  The absence of police terrorism and homeland security professionals and the 
aforementioned proactive efforts clearly indicates the homeland security mission is not 
yet considered a core police mission at the local level.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines three homeland security policy options for the municipal 
police community.  It focuses on the current and future roles of municipal police 
organizations in the nation’s Homeland Security Strategy.  It investigates the benefit of 
creating and implementing a new homeland security approach, one that is based upon a 
collaborative, synergistic, community-level, homeland security construct that places the 
municipal police community at the forefront of America’s domestic security efforts.  
The principle research question is:  How should municipal police agencies 
participate in America’s homeland security?  
C.  METHODOLOGY  
In an effort to protect the country from terrorism the federal government has 
published a number of domestic security-related documents; there are National Strategies 
(NSs), Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs), National Security 
Presidential Directives (NSPDs), National Preparedness Goals, and as of January 2008, 
there is a National Response Framework (NRF) – and there are many more.  These 
important national documents originate from several presidential administrations and 
seek to provide guidance and direction to a wide spectrum of homeland security entities.  
Yet, none provides the municipal police community with specific homeland security-
related direction and guidelines.   
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This research seeks to fill that void.  It seeks to identify what the homeland 
security roles, responsibilities and expectations are for municipal police departments by 
interviewing homeland security professionals, examining current homeland security, 
counterterrorism and intelligence initiatives and by conducting a comprehensive literature 
review.  Through the course of this research, eleven critical elements (called imperatives) 
have been identified.  Imperatives are elements that must be present in order for a 
strategy or policy option (alternative) to be successful at the municipal police level.   
Utilizing policy options analysis methodology three homeland security 
alternatives for the municipal police community are examined and contrasted.  The 
ultimate goal of this methodology is to identify the smartest homeland security 
methodology for the municipal police community – and broader America. 
D.    SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research will expose and examine America’s current (and needless) 
vulnerability to transnational, domestic and asymmetric terrorism.  It also exposes the 
problems of domestic intelligence collection, and the reasons why the vast majority of 
municipal police agencies play only minor and peripheral roles in our nation’s homeland 
security.  It will add significantly to the national debate as to whether municipal police 
agencies can have a positive – even critical role – in domestic security.  This research 
project will go beyond the typical homeland security “general recommendations” that are 
so prolific in our national strategies, and actually propose specific homeland security 
roles, responsibilities and methodologies for the municipal police community and local 
citizenry.   
This research will provide America’s homeland security policy writers, police 
executives, and state administrators with a new and unique homeland security strategy 
that incorporates all of the country’s homeland security assets into a collaborative 
framework.   
It is this writer’s hope that this research will have a profound effect on our 
homeland security philosophy, municipal police community, and the manner in which 
America implements its homeland security strategy.  
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E. AUDIENCE  
This research is intended for the Department of Homeland Security and the 
municipal police community.  It is relevant to all levels of government, academia, and to 
professional law enforcement organizations such as the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).  It is intended 
to be applicable to a broad spectrum of governmental, community, and homeland security 
entities, such as fire and health departments, public and private security agencies, 
business and infrastructure executives, and community stakeholders.   
F. CHAPTER OUTLINES  
1. Chapter II – Literature Review 
The literature review examines the homeland security literature field for specific 
guidance relative to the municipal police community.  Municipal police executives must 
know what is expected of their departments regarding the domestic security front.  To 
this end, this review examines whether or not police executives have received the 
necessary specific homeland security guidance to protect effectively their communities– 
and our country – from terrorism.  
2. Chapter III – Evidence 
Using New England as an example, this chapter provides the evidence that 
supports the assertion that most municipal police departments are not proactively 
participating in America’s homeland security strategy.  This researcher contacted the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office in each of the six New England states and asked either the Anti-
Terrorism Coordinator or the Intelligence Research Specialist how many municipal 
police departments in their state have a sworn officer on staff assigned to homeland 
security or anti-terrorism responsibilities.  Shockingly, very few municipal police 
departments have someone on staff that is responsible for protecting the community from 
terrorism.   
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3. Chapter IV – Imperatives and Policy Options  
This chapter describes the imperatives used to assess each of the three policy 
options presented in this research.  A detailed description of the imperatives is provided.  
Each imperative is considered an essential component of a municipal-level homeland 
security strategy and has direct utility for municipalities and municipal law enforcement 
agencies.   
There are three homeland security policy options (alternatives) that America can 
adopt: (1) continue with the status quo; (2) expand current homeland security programs to 
fit a national scale; or (3) implement a new homeland security strategy.  This chapter 
describes each option and lays the foundation for a comparative analysis.  
4. Chapter V – Analysis   
This chapter explains the analysis conducted for this project.  In this chapter, each 
policy option is compared against the aforementioned imperatives.  And, each option is 
compared against the other options.  By conducting the analysis in this fashion, the 
strengths and weaknesses of each option are exposed and a preferred solution to 
America’s homeland security dilemma is revealed. 
5. Chapter VI – Local Homeland Security Strategy (MHSS) 
This chapter provides the reader with a detailed explanation of the preferred 
solution, the Municipal Homeland Security Strategy (MHSS).  It introduces the reader to 
a new, collaborative approach to homeland security and the concept of municipal 
homeland security.  The MHSS is a new and innovative approach of protecting the local 
community from terrorism.  It is a collaborative strategy that integrates all of America’s 
homeland security assets into a networked, synergistic design.   
6. Chapter VII – Homeland Security Officers (MHSOs) and Community 
Homeland Security Officers (CHSOs) 
Chapter VII introduces the reader to the municipal homeland security officer 
(MHSO) and the community homeland security officer (CHSO).  The MHSO and the 
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CHSO are jointly responsible for securing their communities from terrorism and 
catastrophic accident.  These officers are vital to the municipal homeland security 
strategy, as they partner to lead their community’s homeland security efforts.  These 
officers coordinate and manage all aspects of the Community Protection Plan for their 
respective community. 
The MHSO is appointed by the local police chief (from the ranks of sworn 
personnel) and serves his or her community as the resident expert on all matters relative 
to homeland security.  The CHSO is appointed by the local administrator (mayor, town 
manager, etc.) from the local government’s staff and serves as the administration’s 
connection to the community’s homeland security efforts.   
7. Chapter VIII – Municipal Homeland Security Network (MHSN)  
The municipal homeland security network (MHSN) is the domestic information 
and intelligence collection and dissemination mechanism for the MHSS.  The network is 
comprised of MHSOs and any other federal, state or local individual or group that can 
contribute to a region’s security.  Presently in America, there is no such mechanism or 
entity at the community level.  The MHSN fills this void.  This chapter provides a 
detailed explanation of the MHSN, its composition, methodology and the products it 
produces. 
8. Chapter IX – Strategy Implementation and Conclusion 
The final chapter in this research describes a specific approach to strategy 
implementation and makes specific recommendations toward that end.  It also provides 
the reader with the project’s conclusion.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
The purpose of this review is to examine the current state of existing literature 
relative to the role municipal police departments play in our nation’s homeland security 
strategy.  Specifically, this review sought to determine whether or not the municipal 
police community has been provided the necessary guidance, roles and responsibilities to 
integrate into either national or state strategy.  
The literature in the homeland security field is vast and encompasses nearly every 
topic, ranging from foreign terrorist organizations to neighborhood watch programs.  
Therefore, I separated this massive field of literature into smaller, more manageable sub-
literatures.  These include national documents; state strategies; literature produced by 
professional law enforcement organizations such as the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).   
The 9/11 Commission Report noted, “Those attacks showed, emphatically, that 
ways of doing business rooted in a different era are not good enough.  Americans should 
not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system designed generations ago for a 
world that no longer exists.”9  America must move beyond a response-oriented mindset 
and begin concentrating on prevention.  Prevention and collaborative action are the 
necessary ingredients for a secure America.  Therefore, the national strategies and other 
national documents were examined explicitly for standardized, preventative-based 
guidelines relative to the municipal police community. 
This review does not conduct an evaluation of the overall effectiveness of any 
national or state strategy, nor is it concerned with post-event response-oriented 
procedures.  This review seeks to answer the following questions:  What are the specific 
roles and responsibilities for municipal police agencies in America’s homeland security 
                                                 
9 National Commission on Terrorist Acts Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004). 
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strategy?  What expectations does the federal government have for municipal police 
departments in the areas of homeland security, counterterrorism, domestic intelligence 
collection and infrastructure protection?  And, is there a standardized, preventative-based 
national framework that unifies all of America’s police assets against terrorism?   
This review will demonstrate that there is relatively little written on the specific 
responsibilities municipal police departments have in our nation’s homeland security 
strategy.  This discovery is not surprising.  After all, homeland security is a new and 
complex paradigm for police executives and political leaders.  Professor Christopher 
Bellavita of the Naval Postgraduate School put it this way: “Preventing terrorism is a new 
role for public safety agencies.  They are used to responding to daily emergencies, not 
stopping acts of war.”10  The gaps in this literature field reflect the newness of the 
homeland security mission and should serve as a warning for America. 
1. The National Approach 
As a starting point, one might ask why the federal government should be expected 
to provide the municipal police community with anti-terrorism and homeland security-
related guidance.  The answer is found in the following excerpt from a 2004 General 
Accounting Office report: “These strategies represent the administration’s guidance to the 
federal, state, local, private, and international sectors, for combating terrorism and 
securing the homeland and, equally important, for sustaining efforts into the future.”11  
Throughout its existence, the federal government has gained invaluable 
experience at confronting terrorism through “…political, diplomatic, legal, law 
enforcement, and military means.”12  The government must translate this experience into 
strategic vision, mission and goals for state and local governments, and every level of law 
enforcement.  It must provide direction to these entities with clear articulation.  In a 
                                                 
10 Christopher Bellavita, “What is Preventing Homeland Security?” Homeland Security Affairs 1, no. 
1, art. 3, (2005). 
11 United States General Accounting Office Report, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected 
Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, 2004, www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-
408T (accessed November 3, 2008). 
12 Doron Zimmerman and Andreas Wenger, ed. How States Fight Terrorism, Policy Dynamics in the 
West (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007).  
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world containing weapons of mass destruction and emerging asymmetric terrorism, it is 
not practical to assume the municipal police community has the expertise to construct 
effective countermeasures to such threats – especially, when it has only limited and 
occasional experience in this field.   
The good news is that the federal government has done an admirable job of 
providing America with broad overarching vision, particularly in the area of the national 
strategies.  The strategies outline the nation’s vision and goals on such topics as 
combating terrorism, infrastructure protection, weapons of mass destruction, cyberspace, 
money laundering, national security, and homeland security. 
“These strategies are national in scope, cutting across levels of government and 
sectors and involving a large number of organizations and entities (i.e., the federal, state, 
local, and private sectors).  In addition, national strategies frequently have international 
components, and they may be part of a structure of overlapping or supporting national 
strategies.  Furthermore, the federal government does not control many of the sectors, 
organizations, entities, and resources involved in implementing the national strategies.”13   
The bad news is there is not a single national document that provides the 
necessary guidance, roles and responsibilities to mobilize the law enforcement 
community into a unified national effort.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(NSHS) is the primary national strategy that should provide these elements and 
orchestrate the efforts of America’s various law enforcement communities – but it does 
not.  The NSHS states, “The purpose of strategy is to guide, organize, and unify our 
Nation’s homeland security efforts.”14  Yet, seven years after 9/11, the majority of 
municipal police departments have not received the necessary guidance to “organize and 
unify.”  Every municipal-level homeland security program in existence was originated by 
proactive police leaders who took matters into their own hands.  There is no government-
led unification of the country’s law enforcement assets – especially at the municipal 
level.   
                                                 
13 GAO Report, Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism. 
14 National Strategy for Homeland Security. 
 14
In fact, there are only a few options available for municipal police agencies to 
participate in national (preventative-based) homeland security efforts.  Police executives 
can send a representative to their state’s monthly Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council 
(ATAC) meeting or they can assign a police officer to the nearest FBI Joint Terrorism 
Task Force (JTTF).  However, neither of these options is designed to provide the 
municipal police community with specific operational guidelines, roles or responsibilities 
in the area of homeland security.  And, neither option was orchestrated by national 
strategy.  
The NSHS goes on to state, “The Federal Government also is responsible for 
developing national strategies as well as promulgating best practices, national standards 
for homeland security, and national plans, as appropriate.”15  But, municipal police-
related best practices and national standards cannot be found within the pages of the 
NSHS or any national document.  On page thirty-three of the recently updated NSHS, 
there is a section entitled “Roles and Responsibilities.”  Surprisingly, this section is solely 
dedicated to incident response – not prevention.  Overall, the NSHS is not an effective 
strategy for the municipal police community.   
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is another document where one would 
expect to find specific guidance for the municipal police community.  This strategy 
“…provides a broad framework for strengthening the U.S. security in the future.  It 
identifies the national security goals of the United States, describes the foreign policy and 
military capabilities necessary to achieve those goals, evaluates the current status of these 
capabilities, and explains how national power will be structured to utilize these 
capabilities.”16  This thesis asserts that the municipal police community is a vital 
component of the broad framework the NSS describes.  Therefore, national strategy must 
provide relative guidance to the police community – or the framework is not complete.  
The NSS states “A government has no higher obligation than to protect the lives 
and livelihoods of its citizens.  The hard core of the terrorists cannot be deterred or 
                                                 
15 The National Strategy for Homeland Security. 
16 GAO Report, Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism. 
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reformed; they must be tracked down, killed, or captured. They must be cut off from the 
network of individuals and institutions on which they depend for support. That network 
must in turn be deterred, disrupted, and disabled by using a broad range of tools.” 17  
America’s municipal law enforcement community is a tool that should be effectively 
utilized in America’s national security, but it is not included in this strategy.  The NSS 
focuses on building international action and bringing the fight to the enemies of America 
wherever they may be.  The enemies of America have been inside America before; it is 
safe to assume they will be here again.  Therefore, it makes sense to layer our national 
strategy and include the municipal police community in that effort.   
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) is the third national 
strategy where the municipal police community should find guidance.  This strategy 
“…elaborates on the terrorism aspects of the National Security Strategy by expounding 
on the need to destroy terrorist organizations, win the “war of ideas,” and strengthen 
security at home and abroad.”18  Strengthening security at home is exactly what the 
country needs and it must be accomplished through unifying strategy.   
Therefore, one expects to find standardization and a detailed plan of action that 
works toward that end, but, similar to the NSHS and NSS, there is relatively little in this 
strategy for non-federal law enforcement.  The National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism simply does not provide America’s municipal police agencies with the 
necessary guidance to combat terrorism in their communities.   
There is hope, however, and evidence the federal government is beginning to 
recognize the importance of providing guiding principles and specific responsibilities to 
entities below the federal level.  In March 2008, the federal government replaced the 
National Response Plan (NRP) with the National Response Framework (NRF). “The 
National Response Framework (NRF) presents the guiding principles that enable all  
 
                                                 
17 The National Security Strategy, 2006, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006 (accessed November 17, 
2008). 
18 Government Accounting Office Report, Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 
Strategies Related to Terrorism, 5. 
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response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and 
emergencies.  It establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic 
incident response.”19   
Hopefully, this is the beginning of a trend.  By providing guiding principles to 
emergency responders, the government is setting a minimum standard and unifying 
action in this critical area.  Hopefully, the government will take similar steps on the 
prevention-side and implement prevention-oriented guiding principles for America’s 
most prolific homeland security asset – the municipal police community.   
2.     State Homeland Security Strategies (SHSS) 
The second body of literature relevant to this research is the state strategies.  The 
California, Arizona, Texas and Massachusetts state strategies were examined.  These 
states were selected based on the following criteria: population size, significant state and 
national infrastructure, important national resources, vital coastal borders, and 
commercial maritime ports (except Arizona).  The Texas and California state strategies 
were also selected because each has extensive experience at responding to catastrophic 
disasters.  As previously stated, this review is not intended to determine the overall 
quality of each strategy.  Rather, the intent is to determine if each state has defined 
homeland security roles for municipal police agencies and developed a plan to integrate 
those agencies into a state-wide, preventative-based collaborative framework. 
 A common deficiency in the state strategies is the absence of municipal police roles and 
responsibilities.  After reading a state strategy, this researcher was often left asking, 
“What role does a municipal police department play in the state’s homeland security 
strategy?” and, “What does a municipal police homeland security program look like?” 
One would think state homeland security strategies would describe with great detail the 
steps municipal police departments must take in this regard.  They do not. 
The research shows that state strategies, similar to their national counterparts, are 
admirable starting points and provide broad strategic guidance.  “The State Strategy 
                                                 
19 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/committees/editorial_0566.shtm (accessed October 15, 2008). 
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provides the general framework for all homeland security efforts…”20  The Arizona and 
Massachusetts strategies follow a similar approach – broad guidance.  The California 
strategy is also broad in scope, but unlike the other strategies, it contains sections where 
police executives can find specific municipal police-related guidance.   
Of all the strategies reviewed, the California strategy offers the most 
comprehensive plan for municipal police executives – particularly in the area of 
intelligence collection.  In California, there is a State Terrorism Threat Assessment 
System (STTAS), a State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (STTAC) and four 
Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers (RTTACs).  The STTAS “is a 
collaborative effort to gather and analyze information, employ cutting-edge analytical 
tools and methodologies to produce and share timely and actionable Homeland Security 
information between agencies and across the full range of public safety disciplines.”21  
The STTAC provides state-wide threat assessment capabilities while the RTTACs 
provide regional assessment capabilities.   
How does the California intelligence system relate to the specific responsibilities 
of municipal police executives?  The primary method is through collection.  The 
assessment centers in California are only as good as the information they receive from the 
field.  Therefore, there must be a mechanism to collect and feed information to the 
RTTACS.  This is where the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program becomes 
important.  TLOs are specially trained terrorism officers who identify, collect and 
disseminate terrorism-related materials.  TLOs review police reports, collaborate with 
community leaders and serve as the primary collection agents at the local level.  Police 
executives appoint TLOs to staff and thereby integrate with the state’s intelligence 
system.   
In an effort to increase domestic collection, California’s strategy is to “enhance 
and expand the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program to include officers representing 
                                                 
20 The Texas State Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2005-2010, 
www.governor.state.tx.us/files/homeland/HmLndSecurity_StratPlan.pdf (accessed April 15, 2008). 
21 The California State Homeland Security Strategy, 
www.homeland.ca.gov/pdf/2008_CA_State_Homeland_Security_Strategy.pdf (accessed January 13, 
2008). 
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Law Enforcement, Public Safety, State Agencies, and Private Security Firms”22  In terms 
of collection, municipal police leaders understand that if they want to proactively 
contribute to the state’s intelligence system, they need to appoint a TLO to staff.  
California intends to support this objective by expanding a TLO training course for police 
officers, sheriffs and other participants.   
Arizona also utilizes TLOs, but does not have as detailed a plan as California.  
The other two states in this review base domestic intelligence collection on serendipitous 
chance encounters and haphazard circumstance.  In these states, if a police officer 
becomes aware of a suspicious incident, he or she is to report that incident to the state’s 
fusion center.  This approach is response oriented and does not integrate police 
departments into the intelligence system.  “Collection is the bedrock of intelligence.”23  
Without collection, the analysis and dissemination aspects are mute. 
The Massachusetts intelligence strategy is based on the state’s 24/7 fusion center. 
“The operational and organizational “hub” of the Commonwealth’s homeland security 
efforts will be a 24/7 information fusion center maintained by the Massachusetts State 
Police Criminal Intelligence Section (Fusion Center).”24  Fusion centers do not have the 
personnel, expertise, and in most cases, the authority to go into the communities and 
collect information.  Most analysts are non-sworn, civilian employees.  The strategy’s 
focus on the fusion center, rather than a comprehensive collection strategy, leaves most 
police chiefs wondering how they can participate.   
The Arizona state strategy identifies eighteen “Capability-Specific Objectives.”  
The “Eighteen objectives support the National Homeland Security Strategy, the National 
Preparedness Goal, the SHSS goal and priorities, by addressing threat and 
                                                 
22 The California State Homeland Security Strategy, 
www.homeland.ca.gov/pdf/2008_CA_State_Homeland_Security_Strategy.pdf (accessed January 13, 
2008). 
23 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence from Secrets to Policy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly 
Press, 2006). 
24 Commonwealth of Massachusetts State Homeland Security Strategy, Office of Domestic 
Preparedness, 2004. 
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vulnerability.”25  Yet, not one of the eighteen objectives instructs municipal police 
leaders as to what they must do to help the state reach its homeland security goals.  Next 
to the California strategy, the Texas strategy offers the most detailed information for 
municipal law enforcement.  (Interestingly the term “law enforcement” is mentioned fifty 
times in the Texas strategy – more than any state reviewed.  The California strategy 
mentions law enforcement forty-one times, Arizona twelve times, and Massachusetts 
only seven times.)   
Similar to the other states in this review, Texas does not provided specific roles, 
responsibilities and guidelines for police agencies.  Texas certainly includes police 
agencies into state strategy, but clear, prevention-based responsibilities are not defined.  
The Texas strategy is designed as “a high-level road map for our homeland security 
efforts over the next five years.”26  If the strategy is only a high-level road map, where do 
police executives or other homeland security professionals find guidance – from a low-
level road map?   
One area where Texas strategy does provide limited guidance to police executives 
is in the area of training.  Texas proposes to “establish statewide counterterrorism and 
intelligence training requirements for law enforcement and other homeland security-
related personnel.”27  Similar to California, Texas police executives can send personnel 
to standardized training that is designed to support the state’s intelligence efforts.  
Through this specific training, police agencies can integrate (albeit at a minimum level) 
into the state’s homeland security strategy.  
The primary problem with each of the strategies examined in this review is the 
distinct lack of specificity for municipal police executives. Police executives must know 
where their specific homeland security responsibilities begin and end.  They must know 
what is determined to be local responsibility and state responsibility.   
                                                 
25 2007 Arizona Homeland Security Strategy, http://www.azdohs.gov/SecurityStrategy.htm (accessed 
November 10, 2008). 
26 Texas State Homeland Security Strategy. 
27 Ibid. 
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The driving motive of a state homeland security strategy should be to devise a 
comprehensive methodology that clearly and precisely defines how individual state assets 
integrate into a unified framework.  The methodology must provide specific roles and 
responsibilities for police executives.  It must define the state’s expectations for police 
agencies in the areas of infrastructure protection, border security, intelligence collection, 
regionalization, terrorism investigation and awareness.  State homeland security strategy 
must provide overarching strategic plans, as well as specific guidance and detailed 
instruction when necessary.   
3.     Professional Law Enforcement Organizations  
The third body of literature relevant to this research emanates from the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the Police Executive Research 
Forum (PERF).  These two organizations are the premier professional law enforcement 
organizations in America.  Subsequently, these organizations should provide the 
necessary guidance municipal police leaders need to secure their communities from 
terrorism effectively.  
Both the IACP and PERF have published documents that examine the multitude 
of problems associated with municipal homeland security and broad national strategy.  
Each organization has made important recommendations in a host of homeland security-
related areas to the federal government, federal law enforcement agencies, state agencies 
and municipal police executives.   
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) is an agency whose 
stated goal is “to advance the science and art of police services; to develop and 
disseminate improved administrative, technical and operational practices and promote 
their use in police work.”28  It accomplishes this goal by providing municipal police 
leaders with the necessary guidance they need to lead their departments effectively.   
                                                 
28 International Association of Chiefs of Police, http://www.theiacp.org (accessed May 13, 2008). 
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In 2002, the IACP published a document entitled: “Leading from the Front: Law 
Enforcement’s Role in Combating and Preparing for Terrorism.29  This document marks 
the beginning of a very proactive and forward-thinking approach toward developing a 
framework for local homeland security strategy.  In this document, the IACP provides 
specific guidance for police leaders in areas of prevention, intelligence, relationship 
building, response - and many others.  This publication calls upon municipal police 
executives to provide leadership in homeland security and to “build and maintain strong 
ties and an open dialogue with other federal law enforcement agencies.30  One of the 
most important recommendations made in this document is:  
“The chief's first step to assess community risk is to assign an officer or unit to 
identify potential targets and to enhance security at those targets. This step must be taken 
even when a department's resources are limited.  In preparing a community plan, the 
officer should assess potential targets, consider security measures, help develop a security 
plan for potential targets, and advise on protective measures.”31  
The above quote demonstrates that the IACP recognizes the importance of having 
someone in the municipal police department assigned to homeland security duties.  The 
guidance provided here is based on preventative action.  It tells police leaders to assess 
potential targets and identify vulnerabilities in their community, and to help identify 
solutions to those vulnerabilities.   
Another forward-thinking recommendation made by the IACP is that police 
agencies maintain a suspicious incident log (separate from the main duty log) in order to 
more efficiently track and detect potential terrorism activities.  These two 
recommendations have the potential to save hundreds, if not thousands of people from 
being killed by terrorists.  
                                                 
29 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Leading from the Front: Law Enforcement’s Role in 
Combating and Preparing for Terrorism, 
http://theiacp.org/search_results/?cx=015870105778908594253%3Ajtwqbdl3miy&cof=FORID%3A11&q




This is precisely the kind of prevention-oriented guidance the IACP and PERF 
must provide more of.  And, this is the type of guidance this review sought to find in the 
national and state strategies.  This caliber of guidance has utility for municipal police 
leaders and can be immediately implemented by virtually any law enforcement agency.   
Overall, this is an excellent document for municipal police departments; the 
guidance it provides should not be ignored.  Where the document fell short is in the area 
of depth.  Police executives need more preventative-type guidance that can be 
immediately implemented into a municipal homeland security plan.  Securing the 
community is the special skill of the municipal police department.  The IACP should 
develop that skill.   
In 2002, The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), supported by the U.S. 
Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), 
published the first of six volumes entitled, “Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: 
Strategies for Local Law Enforcement.”32  Together, these volumes represent the most 
comprehensive collection of homeland security-related guidance for the municipal police 
community.  Each volume is dedicated to a particular homeland security-related law 
enforcement issue.  The topics include Local Federal Partnerships, Working With 
Diverse Communities, Preparing for and Responding to Bioterrorism, The Production 
and Sharing of Intelligence, Partnerships to Promote Homeland Security and Partnering 
for Preparation and Response for Critical Incidents.  
Overall, these six volumes are excellent starting points for municipal police 
leaders.  Police executives can refer to each volume for guidance and apply that guidance 
toward developing a municipal homeland security program.  These documents are broad 
in scope, covering a multitude of topics in homeland security ranging from national 
policy to building partnerships with the local citizenry.  Experts in the fields of 
intelligence, emergency services, law enforcement, fire and a host of related disciplines  
 
 
                                                 
32 All six volumes can be located online: http://www.policeforum.org/library.asp?MENU=346 
(accessed November 17, 2008). 
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contributed to the development of each volume.  Subsequently, the recommendations 
contained therein derive from the collective experiences and knowledge of numerous 
professionals, rather than just one expert or agency.   
Despite the enormous breath and depth of the topics covered in these volumes, 
they are missing one important component – a framework for municipal homeland 
security.  Many of the recommendations provided in the series are meaningful and have 
utility for police agencies, but they must be applied to a structured framework.  Making 
recommendations to police executives is only the first step in constructing a homeland 
security strategy.  The next step – the critical step – is determining how to implement 
those recommendations best.  
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This literature review demonstrates that municipal police executives have not 
received defining guidance relative to their agencies’ specific homeland security roles 
and responsibilities.  This review makes evident the absence of national, state or 
municipal-level strategy that integrates municipal police agencies into America’s 
domestic security efforts.  Federal strategy is too broad to be effective at the municipal 
level, and state strategy typically lacks specificity. And, professional organizations such 
as the IACP and PERF have provided local agencies only bits and pieces of detailed 
homeland security-related information.  Subsequently, municipal homeland security 
efforts continue to be fragmented and decentralized.  
 24
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III. EVIDENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis asserts that municipal police departments are not proactively involved 
in America’s homeland security strategy.  As a result, America is not protected from 
terrorists and other malcontents who wish to do us harm.  This thesis also asserts that 
America lacks a definitive domestic information and intelligence collection strategy.  
Most police departments collect homeland security or anti-terrorism information much 
the same way as before 9/11 – serendipitously.   
For purposes of this research, municipal homeland security (MHLS) duties are 
considered to be those activities that protect (in a proactive and preventative way) a 
municipality from terrorists and potentially catastrophic accidents.  MHLS centers on 
identifying a community’s vulnerabilities and implementing solutions to those 
vulnerabilities.  Proactive activities include (but are not limited to) building collaboration 
with homeland security agencies; conducting risk and vulnerability assessments for 
businesses, schools and infrastructures; hardening potential targets; developing site-
security plans for major events.  Municipal homeland security is purposefully proactive 
in design and is not concerned with emergency response procedures.   
Anti-terrorism (AT) duties are those activities that concentrate primarily on 
finding terrorists, their sympathizers, and the crimes that support terrorism.  AT focuses 
on identifying and arresting terrorists.  Anti-terrorism duties are considered a sub-
component of homeland security duties; homeland security duties are not considered a 
sub-component of AT duties.    
Determining which police departments in the United States have a sworn officer 
assigned to homeland security or antiterrorism duties is nearly impossible.  According to 




local sheriff departments in the United States – and, there is no central registry or agency 
at the national or state level that tracks the number of homeland security or anti-terrorism 
officers.  Contacting some 15,800 police agencies was impractical. 
Even those states that have terrorism liaison officers do not have a central registry 
to account for active TLO numbers.  California and Arizona, two states that utilize TLOs, 
track how many people have taken their states’ TLO training course, but do not track 
which TLOs are active and which have been re-assigned to other responsibilities.    
On the other hand, numerous municipal police departments and governmental 
agencies track the personnel assigned to specialties such as gang violence, child abuse, 
juvenile delinquency, domestic violence, and drugs in schools.  A search of the website 
for the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs reveals numerous reports 
on the subject.33  Hopefully, at some point in the near future, federal and state 
governments will consider homeland security an important enough responsibility to track 
municipal homeland security efforts – beyond how many people have taken a terrorism-
related course.  
Before examining available data on municipal-level homeland security and anti-
terrorism programs we must first approximate how many municipal police officers there 
are in the United States today. 
In 2004, there were approximately 621,992 full-time sworn municipal law 
enforcement officers in 15,833 jurisdictions, according to the Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics.34  During that same time, federal agencies employed 106,000 
full-time personnel authorized to make arrests and carry firearms.35  The FBI website 
states that on September 30, 2008, the FBI had approximately 12,851 special agents.36   
                                                 
33 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Law 
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics, 2000: Data for Individual State and Local 
Agencies with 100 or More Officers, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/lemas00.htm (accessed October 
1, 2008). 
34 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Law 
Enforcement Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm (accessed October 1, 2008). 
35 Ibid. 
36 FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/quickfacts.htm (accessed October 1, 2008). 
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These numbers indicate there are 5.9 municipal police and sheriff officers for 
every 1 federally employed, full-time agent (621,992 divided by 106,000 = 5.9 officers).  
If we re-calculate the equation using the 2008 FBI personnel data, there are 48.4 
municipal police and sheriff officers for every 1 FBI agent (621,992 divided by 12,851 = 
48.40).   
In terms of shear numbers, the municipal police community dramatically 
outnumbers federal agents.  Consider that municipal police and sheriff officers live and 
work in the very communities terrorists are planning to strike and it is easy to see why 
these officers should comprise the largest component of America’s homeland security 
strategy.     
B. WHERE TO FIND DATA? 
As previously mentioned, there is no national or state database that tracks the 
number of municipal police officers assigned homeland security or anti-terrorism duties.  
Therefore, this researcher considered federal and state agencies that would most likely be 
aware of which police departments have designated homeland security or anti-terrorism 
officers.  The U.S. Attorney’s Office was identified as such an agency, due to the fact that 
this agency operates Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATACs) throughout the United 
States.  These ATACs have open membership for law enforcement agencies and serve as 
the primary link between local law enforcement and federal-level anti-terrorism effort.   
The U.S. Justice Department, the parent agency of U.S. Attorney’s Offices, states 
in its 2007-2012 Strategic Plan that ATACs “…will coordinate antiterrorism initiatives 
by ensuring that federal, state, and local enforcement efforts are focused and coordinated 
as they pursue targets that may be connected to terrorism.”37  If focusing and 
coordinating local law enforcement’s antiterrorism efforts are priorities for the U.S. 
Attorney, one would assume that agency tracks which police departments have 
antiterrorism officers.   
                                                 
37 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Fiscal Years 2007- 2012 Strategic Plan, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/strategic2007-2012/ (accessed October 5, 2008), 28. 
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In order to keep the data for this project manageable, this researcher focused on 
the six New England states of Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, 
Connecticut and Rhode Island.  Either the Anti-Terrorism Coordinator or the Intelligence 
Research Specialist for each U.S. Attorney’s Office was asked how many police 
departments have a sworn part-time or full-time officer assigned to homeland security or 
anti-terrorism duties.   
In each instance, the person on the telephone did not know – with absolute 
certainty – how many officers in their state were assigned to these important 
responsibilities.  This revelation is not surprising, given that police executives are not 
required to report to the U.S. Attorney’s Office – or anywhere for that matter – the names 
of officers they assign homeland security (HLS) or anti-terrorism (AT) duties.  In 
addition, police executives are not required to notify the U.S. Attorney’s Office whenever 
an officer is assigned away from homeland security duties.  Moreover, U.S. Attorney 
personnel are not required to identify which police departments have dedicated HLS or 
AT personnel.  Therefore, the process of becoming acquainted with a U.S. Attorney’s 
Office (at least in this research area) is based solely on self-introduction.   
Typically, when a police officer is assigned homeland security responsibilities 
(either full- or part-time) that officer makes himself or herself known to the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office.  The process usually does not work the other way around.  
Subsequently, the U.S. Attorney’s Office rarely has an accurate account of which police 
departments are actively conducting HLS or AT activities in their communities.  
However, the anti-terrorism coordinator and the intelligence research specialist are in the 
best position in each state to know which police departments either have or do not have 
HLS or AT officers.  Every U.S. Attorney’s Office hosts homeland security-related 
training events and ATAC meetings.  These meetings occur as often as monthly or as 
infrequently as once every six months.  Surprisingly, there are no established criteria as to 
how often an ATAC meeting should be held.  However, the training events and meetings 
are often well-attended by homeland security, law enforcement and federal-agency 
personnel.  This researcher has personally attended meetings in Massachusetts that have 
had more than 200 hundred attendees.   
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Through the personal contacts established at training events and meetings, ATAC 
personnel learn which departments have terrorism specialists and which do not.  
However, there is a caveat.  If a police department’s newly appointed homeland security 
or anti-terrorism officer does not attend the ATAC meetings, or at least introduce himself 
or herself to ATAC staff, the U.S. Attorney’s Office will not be aware of that officer’s 
efforts.    
This process is the reason the U.S. Attorney personnel interviewed for this 
research were not aware of the exact number of officers working HLS or AT and can 
only provide estimations.  It is important to note this research does not intend to evaluate 
or criticize the efforts of Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council personnel.  However, the 
process ATAC and municipal police personnel meet must be examined in order to 
support the assertion that municipal police departments are not proactively involved in 
America’s homeland security efforts.   
It is also important to note, that it is highly unlikely a U.S. Attorney’s Office – 
particularly ATAC personnel – would not be aware of a full-time municipal homeland 
security or anti-terrorism officer operating in their state.  Any newly appointed full-time 
HLS or AT officer would likely introduce himself or herself to the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office.  In every instance, ATAC personnel could identify the number of full-time 
municipal police officers (they knew of) who were assigned AT responsibilities.  
C.  THE RESEARCH AREA  
New England is comprised of six states and more than 14 million citizens.  It has 
many densely populated regions that contain some of America’s most historical 
landmarks and critical infrastructures.  Many of the world’s most technologically 
advanced companies headquarter their business operations in New England – particularly 
along Massachusetts’ Route 128, also known as America’s Technology Highway.  There 
are major airports, seaports, commercial and financial centers, bioresearch labs, and one 




New England states (Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont) share international borders 
with Canada.  All of these entities, along with the region’s 14.1 million citizens, are 
tightly compacted in just 71,992 square miles.38  
Within the 71,992 square miles of the six New England states, there are 1,536 
cities and towns protected by 716 municipal police agencies and 64 sheriff departments.  
These communities and police departments are supported by four Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces (JTTFs) located in Massachusetts, Maine, Rhode Island and Connecticut.  
Vermont and New Hampshire do not have JTTFs. 
The table below illustrates the number of municipalities, police and sheriff 
departments, municipal police officers assigned to homeland security or anti-terrorism 
duties, estimated state population, square miles and the number of estimated motor 
vehicles in each state. 
The statistics reveal a distinct lack of proactive homeland security effort on behalf 
of the municipal law enforcement community.  In each state, there is only a handful of 










                                                 
38 Information regarding the six New England states obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, 
http://www.census.gov/ (accessed October 1, 2008). 
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Maine 495 113 16 2 1,274,923 35,385 1,071,876 
Massachusetts 351 324 14 4 6,437,193 10,555 5,385,215 
New 
Hampshire 266 196 10 1 1,235,786 9,350 1,059,963 
Rhode Island 40 39 4 3 1,048,319 1,545 805,548 
Connecticut 169 106 6 5 3,510,297 5,543 3,051,952 
Vermont 247 49 14 0 623,908 9,614 587,668 
Total 1,568 827 64 15 14,130,426 71,992 11,962,222 
Table 1.   Approximation of Municipal Police Officers Assigned to Homeland Security39 
Maine, by far the largest state in New England, has nearly 500 municipalities, 
more than 1 million automobiles on its roadways, and an international boarder.  Yet, 
there are only two municipal police officers assigned to anti-terrorism duties in the entire 
state.  In addition, these two officers are assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (as of 
this writing) on a full-time basis.  This means there are no local police officers in the 
entire state of Maine actively identifying community vulnerabilities and undertaking 
other preventative-type homeland security measures to protect local communities from 
terrorism.  No one is conducting target hardening, assessing risk and identifying 
community vulnerabilities, researching public documents and investigating dangerous 
business practices.  Officers assigned to Joint Terrorism Task Forces do not perform such 
proactive activities; these officers concentrate on investigating terrorists and suspicious 
activity leads.  
                                                 
39 Table data obtained from several sources: www.gov websites for each state. U.S. Department of 
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/csllea04.htm (accessed October 
1, 2008); U.S. Department of Transportation, 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs06/motor_vehicles.htm (accessed October 1, 2008). 
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The data for the other New England states is equally as troubling.  Massachusetts 
has nearly five times the population of Maine, yet has only four full-time municipal-level 
officers working homeland security.  (This figure does not include analysts assigned in 
the Boston Police Departments Regional Intelligence Center.)  In Massachusetts, one of 
the four officers is assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force.  The other three are 
Boston Police officers working directly for the intelligence center.   
Similar to Maine, New Hampshire shares an international border with Canada, 
has more than 100 police agencies, and more than 1 million automobiles on its roadways. 
However, this state has only one municipal police officer assigned to homeland security 
duties.  The statistics are similar in Rhode Island and Connecticut.   
In Vermont, the numbers are even more disappointing – no municipal police 
officers are assigned HLS or AT responsibilities.  This is the case despite the fact 
Vermont shares an international border with Canada and there are open-source reports of 
terrorist organizations operating in that country.  According to the Anti-Defamation 
League (ADL) website, “… with the possible exception of the United States, there are 
more international terrorist organizations active in Canada than anywhere in the world.”40  
Yet, not a single municipal law enforcement executive in Vermont has taken the 
proactive measure of assigning someone to municipal homeland security responsibilities, 
even on a part-time basis.   
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter III illustrates a number of significant and troubling points.  First, it is 
plainly evident that municipal police agencies do not consider homeland security a core 
police mission.  If they did, there would be more municipal police officers assigned to 
homeland security and anti-terrorism responsibilities.  Typically, when the police 
community embraces a new mission, resources are quickly dedicated.  For example, at 
the municipal police level, there are police officers specifically trained and assigned to 
investigate gangs, prostitutes, illegal drugs, school violence, traffic law violators, warrant 
                                                 
40 Anti-Defamation League (ADL), http://www.adl.org/terror/tu/tu_0401_canada.asp (accessed 
October 2, 2007). 
 33
absconders and even people who fail to register their dogs.  Yet, the majority of 
municipal police agencies in post-9/11 America do not have anyone on staff dedicated to 
finding those who intend to kill thousands of unsuspecting citizens.  To compound this 
problem, the majority of police agencies do not have anyone on staff looking for the 
force-multiplying mechanisms or community vulnerabilities terrorists seek to exploit.   
Second, there is clearly an absence of a municipal-level collaborative and preventative-
based homeland security strategy.  Municipal-level HLS and AT programs are either 
created or not created at the discretion of municipal police executives; there is no 
integrated or collaborative municipal HLS strategy.   
In addition, there is no consensus as to what is expected of municipal police 
agencies in the homeland security arena.  Subsequently, the municipal police 
community’s response toward homeland security is woefully inadequate.  If “the penalty 
of inadequacy was high before: now it could be final.”41  A single fatality is not enough 
for modern-day terrorists.  Terrorists of the day think in multitudes and consider mass 
calamity a starting point, rather than an end point.  As police organizations continue to 
focus on response and traditional crime – what they know best – the operating 
environments of police officers and terrorists move increasingly further apart.  As a 
result, terrorists are enabled and given an advantage over the police and other HLS assets.  
Essentially, homeland security becomes a game of “catch-up” rather than prevention.  
Subsequently, American society is placed in harms way as our citizens and infrastructure 
are made easy targets for terrorists.  Instead of being part of a solution, municipal police 
departments are now part of the problem – a very big part – because our inaction is self-
destructive and actually empowers terrorists.   
Third, this chapter demonstrates the lack of an effective mechanism to identify 
and collect homeland security information and intelligence.  If no one at the municipal 
police level is proactively searching for HLS-related information, the likelihood of not 
finding such information is certain.  Not finding HLS information does not equate to 
being safe.  Rather, it demonstrates the need for a more effective collection system.   
                                                 
41 Malham M. Wakin, ed. War, Morality, and the Military Profession (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1979).  
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Fourth, this chapter indicates that society has not yet required the municipal 
police community to broaden its mandate to include homeland security and terrorism 
prevention.  There seems to be no pressure from the citizenry, elected officials at any 
level, or the federal government in this regard.  Do Americans assume police agencies 
automatically take the necessary steps to protect them from terrorism?  Or, do citizens 
simply not care enough about terrorism to notice (or complain about) the lack of 
municipal police effort in this important area?  It appears that homeland security does not 
occupy its rightful place in the hearts and minds of American citizenry.  
What we know, what this chapter clearly illustrates, is that our municipal police 
agencies are not proactively involved in homeland security, our hometowns are 
vulnerable to attack, and that America has a great deal of domestic security work left to 




IV. IMPERATIVES AND POLICY OPTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Imperatives, as defined in this research, are essential components of a strategy 
(policy option) that must be present in order for it to be effective.  If any one component 
is missing, the strategy may founder, fail completely, or in some instances – cause people 
to die.  “Strategies vary by level, function and time frame.”42  Different agencies and 
levels of government “develop strategies to deal with the issues they have identified.”43  
In the case of the federal government, homeland security-related strategy has been 
developed with the stated goal of securing America.   
However, national strategy is not effective at orchestrating the homeland security 
efforts of America’s municipal law enforcement community.  New strategy must be 
developed.  To this end, eleven critical imperatives are identified that must be present if 
the strategy is to be effective at the local level.  The imperatives were formed by 
examining national strategies, government reports, academic textbooks, professional 
articles, and by extracting the experiences gained during this researcher’s twelve years in 
the professional law enforcement field.  Seven of those years were spent working full 
time in homeland security.   
The imperatives are: Synergy; Collaboration; Intelligence Function; Vision; 
Mission; Goals; Affordability; Roles and Responsibilities; Proactive Prevention; 
Regionalization; and Bottom-Up Design.  This research evaluates three policy options 
against these imperatives to determine which approach is best suited for the municipal 
police community, the local citizenry, and America.   
There are three policy options (alternatives) that homeland security policy makers 
can adopt: (1) The status quo. This option continues with more of the same; (2) 
                                                 
42 John Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and NonProfit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening 
and Sustaining Organizational Achievement, 3rd ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004).  
43 Ibid 
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Implementation on a broader scale of current anti-terrorism programs such as the 
Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Program that originated in California; or (3) A 
completely new homeland security strategy, such as the Municipal Homeland Security 
Strategy (MHSS).   
B. CRITICAL IMPERATIVES  
Synergy
• High Efficiency Intelligence Function
• Domestic Collection
Vision




• Sense of Purpose
Goals












Figure 1.   The Eleven Critical Imperatives 
1.   Synergy 
Synergy is “the interaction of two or more agents or forces so that their combined 
effect is greater than the sum of their individual effects.”44  Succinctly stated, synergy is 
high efficiency.  It is achieved when municipal police agencies seamlessly integrate and  
 
                                                 
44 synergy. Dictionary.com. The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 4th ed., 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/synergy (accessed November 12 
2008).  
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efficiently operate into a homeland security design with other security-related entities.  In 
this context, the output of synergistic effort amounts to more than any one component can 
muster.   
Each policy option is examined for its capability to create effective and highly 
efficient homeland security-related synergy at the local level.  Questions such as: Does 
the policy option effectively integrate homeland security assets at the community level?  
Does the policy option create an environment where HLS synergy can develop?  Do 
assets depend upon each other to accomplish homeland security goals or do they 
concentrate on separate mandates?  Synergy is at the high-end of the efficiency spectrum.    
2. Collaboration 
Collaboration is “agencies, organizations, and individuals from many tiers of 
public and private sectors, working, training, and exercising together for the common 
purpose of preventing terrorist threats to people and property”45  The intent of 
collaboration is to build in capacity while simultaneously building out inefficiency.  In 
the context of this thesis, collaboration is prevention-based and designed to detect 
terrorism pre-incident.  Effective municipal homeland security strategy must facilitate 
collaborative effort.  Collaboration is considered the minimum level of interaction 
between municipal police agencies and other homeland security entities.   
Therefore, each policy option is examined for its capability to create and foster 
collaboration across disciplines, jurisdictions and levels of government.  And, each policy 
option is examined for its ability to foster collaboration of HLS assets at the local level.  
This examination seeks to answer the following questions: Does the policy option require 
HLS assets to work together or is interaction only occasional?  Do HLS assets work 
together and effectively address HLS issues within the community?  
                                                 
45 William Pelfrey, Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 2, no. 1, art. 5 (2005), 
7. 
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3. Intelligence Function  
Systematic domestic intelligence collection is the defining characteristic of a 
secure community – and nation.  Where there is a lack of systematic collection, there is 
vulnerability, exposure to exploitation and ineffectiveness.  To be effective at identifying, 
collecting, and disseminating homeland security-related information there must be an 
established and easily accessible mechanism for the intelligence function at the municipal 
level.  Without such a mechanism, information and intelligence is not efficiently 
collected or disseminated.  Subsequently, information gets stacked in silos and lost in 
antiquated procedure.  
In the context of municipal homeland security intelligence, homeland security 
personnel do not sit idle and wait for suspicious activity or homeland security-related 
leads to be serendipitously discovered.  Rather, leads are actively sought after, collected, 
and vetted into a network of forward-thinking homeland security professionals.  
To this end, the intelligence function encompasses all aspects of homeland 
security information and intelligence.  Each policy option is examined for its capability to 
develop the intelligence function of municipal police agencies in the arena of homeland 
security.   
4. Roles and Responsibilities  
Effective municipal homeland security strategy must define the specific roles and 
responsibilities of municipal law enforcement agencies.  Police executives must know 
what federal and state governments expect of their agencies, where their agency fits in 
with federal and state homeland security strategy and how municipal homeland security 
is performed.   
Do local agencies coordinate with critical infrastructure and design security 
measures, or is that a responsibility reserved for state or federal agencies?  Should local 
police officers search public records for indicators of terrorism?  Should municipal police 
departments seek out employers who hire illegal aliens, or is that reserved for non-local 
law enforcement?   
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There must be specific guidelines for municipal police agencies if they are 
expected to protect their citizens from terrorism.  If they are expected to fill this role, how 
is it accomplished?  Do we leave that responsibility to individual chiefs and further the 
problem of decentralization?  Or, should there be uniformity and standards applied to 
homeland security strategy?   
Each alternative is examined for specific homeland security-related roles and 
responsibilities for municipal police agencies.  The alternative must provide more than 
just guidelines – it must provide specifics.   
5. Regionalization 
Regionalization is collaborative operations in defined boundaries.  It is a 
multitude of disciplines and jurisdictions working together toward the common goal of 
securing a particular region.  Regionalization builds capacity, provides economy of force 
and offers force multiplication.  It is not about losing autonomy, but rather about 
facilitating collective action.  It means improving communication and building pre-
incident relationships before terrorism or catastrophic incidents occur.  Regionalization 
facilitates increased familiarity with neighboring jurisdictions, personnel and potential 
targets.  It standardizes procedures, streamlines processes, and raises situational 
awareness to new heights.  In addition, information and intelligence is simultaneously 
vetted across multiple jurisdictions and disciplines faster than ever before possible.  
Regionalization is cooperative protection for local communities.   
To be effective, an alternative must be concerned with securing multiple 
communities simultaneously.  After all, no community is safe until all communities are 
safe.  Therefore, regionalization of effort, operations, communications, technologies, 
monies, and personnel must be satisfactorily addressed if it is to meet the criteria of this 





Homeland security strategy must have a clear vision as to what it needs to 
accomplish.  Vision is looking toward a specific future.  It is envisioning where you are 
and where you need to go.  One of the most important aspects of vision is that it must be 
shared by all members of an organization, not just its leaders.  In terms of municipal 
homeland security, the vision must be shared by multiple agencies and disciplines.  
Municipalities, municipal police agencies and citizens who participate must comprehend 
and share in the strategy’s vision if they are to work together effectively.  All participants 
must know where the strategy is headed and what it intends to accomplish.  Effective 
homeland security vision involves forward-thinking, focused planning and desired end 
states.   
At its best, a shared vision does the following. 
• “Provides a corporate sense of being 
• Provides a sense of enduring purpose 
• Incorporates measurement of success 
• Transcends day-to-day issues 
• Has legitimate meaning in both the present and the future 
• Empowers both leaders and followers to act”46  
In order to meet the criteria of this imperative, each alternative is examined for its 
capability to provide meaningful vision to a broad spectrum of HLS entities toward the 
desired end-state of a secure community.   
7.  Mission 
Mission “provides that sense of purpose” and direction necessary to accomplish 
goals.47  A sense of mission organizes people and equipment and provides a sense of  
 
                                                 
46 Gordon Sullivan and Michael Harper. Hope is Not a Method (New York, NY: Broadway Books, 
1979).  
47 John Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and NonProfit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening 
and Sustaining Organizational Achievement, 3rd ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004).  
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purpose.  It “answers why an institution exists, its purpose/mandate.  The mission is the 
key building block in the entire planning process.”48  A sense of mission is evident when 
strategy participants move in a common direction.  
To this end, each policy option is examined for its capability to provide a sense of 
mission to municipal police agencies and other homeland security partners as they work 
together to secure a community from terrorists.  
8. Goals 
Goals “represent the strategy-specific states desired as a result of effective 
strategy implementation.”49  Goals must be realistic, measurable and obtainable.  They 
provide clarity and direction.  Clearly defined goals propel forward people, assets and 
strategy while simultaneously limiting the possibility of deviation.  
The three policy alternatives in this thesis are examined for evidence of clearly 
defined homeland security goals relative to people, organizations, processes, technologies 
and methodologies.  
9. Proactive Prevention 
Just as offensive action often overtakes defensive strategy in the military world – 
especially when there is a technological advancement – proactive prevention dominates 
response in the homeland security world.  Proactive prevention is much more than mere 
prevention.  It is taking every possible step to secure the community from terrorists 
before they have the opportunity to attack.  It means that homeland security personnel 
actively identify vulnerabilities and implement the solutions to those vulnerabilities.  
Proactive prevention is (but not limited to) creating community awareness programs, 
visiting with businesses and community groups on a daily basis, and creating the personal  
 
                                                 
48 Nova Scotia Agricultural College (NSAC), http://www.nsac.ns.ca/admin/stratplan/terms.asp 
(accessed August 1, 2007). 
49 John Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and NonProfit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening 
and Sustaining Organizational Achievement, 3rd ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004).  
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relationships necessary to create community-level information sharing groups.  Proactive 
prevention also entails adopting new missions, mandates, ideas and technologies to 
secure a community from terrorists.  
To this end, the operational philosophy of each policy option is examined.  This 
examination seeks to determine whether each policy option meets the above criteria and 
is oriented toward prevention or response.   
10. Bottom-Up Design  
Municipal homeland security is a bottom-up problem.  In order to be effective at 
addressing the many complex issues associated with municipal homeland security, a 
policy option must be constructed with a bottom-up design that emphasizes the municipal 
police community and the local citizenry.  A bottom-up design unites municipal police 
agencies in a common effort and creates ownership within the police community.  The 
strategy must be implemented by municipal police departments with the support and 
guidance of state and federal entities.  Lastly, it must form the base of regional, state and 
national strategy.   
Therefore, the design of each policy option is examined.  This examination sought 
to answer the following questions: Does the option consider local police agencies a vital 
component?  Where is the option’s HLS emphasis?  And, does the option foster 
ownership at the local level?  This thesis asserts that ownership of the policy at the local 
level is vital to strategy success.  If there is no local ownership, there will be only limited 
and peripheral effort on behalf of municipal police agencies.   
11.  Affordability   
A strategy must be affordable in order for it to be effective and accepted at the 
municipal police level.  Police agencies of all sizes and complexities must be able to 
implement and maintain the strategy without incurring significant financial hardship.  In 
addition, the strategy must be sustainable at times of extreme financial distress.   
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C. POLICY OPTIONS  
1.     The Status Quo   
The first option for America’s homeland security policymakers is to continue with 
the current homeland security strategy – the status quo.  The status quo places the largest 
part of our nation’s homeland security responsibility on the shoulders of federal law 
enforcement, federal intelligence agencies, and the nation’s military (the big three), while 
asking very little from the municipal police community.  National strategy orientation is 
decidedly federal and international in scope and does relatively little to integrate the 
decentralized municipal police community into the broader effort of protecting 
Americans from terrorists.  
This option may be plausible as there have been no additional terrorist attacks 
inside the United States since 9/11 and a majority of Americans are now more concerned 
about the economy than terrorism.  A June 15-19, 2008 Gallup poll asked the following 
question of 1,625 national adults: 
 
Figure 2.   Fix the Economy or Protect from Terrorism?50    
                                                 
50 Gallup website, Americans Prioritize the Economy over Terrorism, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/108415/Americans-Prioritize-Economy-Over-Terrorism.aspx (accessed 
November 17, 2008). 
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The lack of attacks inside America, combined with the quick, pre-incident 
apprehension of terrorists when terrorists did attempt attacks, has undoubtedly assuaged 
America’s feelings of anxiety toward terrorism.  In a Gallup poll, conducted June 11-14, 
2007, one month after the May 7 arrest of terrorists plotting to attack Fort Dix, fifty-five 
percent of Americans were not overly worried about terrorism.   
 
 
Figure 3.   Are Americans Worried About Terrorism?51 
There is good reason for America’s concern with the economy.  A September 5, 
2008, Seattle Times article recently stated “The Labor Department reported that the 
number of Americans who filed initial claims for unemployment benefits last week rose 
to near a five-year high.”52  The same article also stated, “Across the board, we're seeing 
evidence that labor conditions are worsening,” said Carl Riccadonna, senior economist at 
Deutsche Bank Securities.”53  
                                                 
51 Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/Home.aspx (accessed April 23, 2007). 
52 Seattle Times, 




A struggling national economy translates into hard financial times for many of 
America’s public service agencies and is forcing them to do more with less.  In addition, 
the enormous demands placed on local police agencies by criminal gangs, illegal drugs 
and traditional crime is 24/7 and is often all the responsibility these agencies can handle.  
Add a struggling local economy into the mix and many police executives assert their 
agencies are incapable of handling anything extra.  If America asks the municipal police 
community to take the lead in homeland security we may find ourselves causing more 
harm than good to our nation’s security.     
In the realm of domestic information and intelligence collection, very little 
proactive effort is occurring at the municipal level.  When seeking information, most 
police agencies rely on chance discovery, shared open-source information, and the 
federal government.  There is no nation-wide proactive domestic information and 
intelligence collection strategy being implemented in America.  In his Naval Postgraduate 
School thesis, Nestor Duarte noted, “Domestic intelligence in the United States, 
specifically state and local HUMINT, is uncoordinated and inefficient to support the 
terrorism prevention mission.”54  Duarte is certainly right, but the problem is far worse 
than implied.  Duarte’s postulation leads us to believe there is something to coordinate.  
Under the status quo, there is nothing to coordinate in the majority of police agencies.  
There is no intelligence framework at the municipal level.  In reality, most police 
departments do not conduct proactive homeland security intelligence collection because 
they do not know how to conduct such operations.  Homeland security and terrorism 
information collection is a completely new mission for municipal police organizations.  
And, in today’s economy many do not have the money for a dedicated intelligence effort.  
As a result, most police departments simply do not proactively attempt to identify 
homeland security or terrorism-related information.   
 
 
                                                 
54 Nestor Duarte, Unleashing Our Untapped Domestic Collection is the Key to Prevention, (Master’s 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2007). 
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Despite the faltering economy, overburdened municipal police agencies, and the 
decentralized law enforcement and intelligence efforts, the current homeland security 
strategy has worked thus far for America.  The proof is that a number of planned terror 
attacks on the American homeland have been thwarted pre-incident.   
Overall, the status quo option presents some very compelling reasons why 
homeland security policy makers should stay on course with the current strategy.  The 
best reason for continuing with the status quo is the fact that we have not been attacked at 
home since 9/11, more than eight years ago.   
2. Expand Current Programs  
The second policy option for homeland security policy makers is to identify 
successful municipal-level homeland security initiatives and expand those initiatives into 
a national framework.  The most commonly implemented municipal-level initiative in the 
U.S. is the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Program that originated in California.   
The TLO concept has experienced intermittent popularity since introduced in 
2001 by a group of police chiefs in southern California.  Individual jurisdictions in 
California, Texas, Florida, Arizona, Michigan and Colorado have implemented TLO 
programs.  However, no state has implemented a state-wide TLO plan.  Therefore, TLOs 
continue to be appointed on a case-by-case basis at the local or regional level.   
The TLO concept is to appoint at least one terrorism-trained sworn officer in 
every law enforcement agency within a particular region “…who has a basic 
understanding of terrorism and who can act as an information resource for members of 
the department.”55 Department personnel or community members submit terrorism-
related information to their agency’s TLO.  This practice is known as self-reporting.  In 
turn, the TLO submits the information to a Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEWG), or 
a regional fusion center, or a state fusion center.  Furthermore, state-level intelligence 
entities disseminate information to law enforcement agencies through the TLO network.    
                                                 
55 The Terrorism Officer Information Network, www.tlo.org (accessed October 1, 2008). 
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A Terrorism Early Warning Group is a multi-disciplined task force of homeland 
security professionals who share homeland security-related information.  According to an 
official at the East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group, the TEWG is positioned 
between the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and local law enforcement 
agencies.  According to the same official, TEWGs are being replaced by Regional and 
State Threat Analysis Fusion Centers.  Accordingly, the East Bat TWEG is scheduled to 
lose funding at the end of 2008. 
Essentially, TLOs serve as information points-of-contact for local law 
enforcement agencies and comprise “a structured system of contact personnel” for 
terrorism-related issues.56  According to a senior level administrator in the Los Angeles 
County Sheriff’s Department, TLOs fulfill their anti-terrorism responsibilities on an as-
needed or collateral basis.  This means the majority of TLOs are patrol personnel who 
spend their day performing their regular police duties.  Only when there is a need for 
terrorism-related action are TLOs called into play.   
TLOs in Arizona are primarily information conduits. They do not investigate 
terrorism-related incidents, but rather, collect information and pass it along to the JTTF.   
Arizona follows a slightly different TLO design than California.  In this state, 
there are four tiers of TLOs, referred to as “tiers 1 through 4.”  Tier 1 TLOs are the best 
trained and best equipped by the state.  Tier 1 TLOs receive a vehicle, communication 
equipment such as a radio or cell phone, and a wireless laptop.  Tier 4 TLOs receive no 
equipment. 
Tier 1 TLOs are required to provide their agency or the Arizona Counter 
Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) at least 40 hours of anti-terrorism-related work 
each month.  Tier 2 TLOs provide 20 hours of work and the lowest two levels (tiers 3 and 
4) are not required to provide time to their agency or ACTIC.   
Surprisingly, Arizona’s TLOs do not concentrate on terrorism or homeland 
security responsibilities. Their primary duty centers on typical police responsibilities, 
                                                 
56 East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group, www.eastbaytewg.org/tlo_position.htm (accessed 
November 1, 2008). 
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such as criminal law violations and traffic enforcement.  Furthermore, TLOs respond 
with their wireless laptop to major crime scenes, such as murders, even if not their patrol 
call.  
TLOs in Arizona also serve as “first responders” who assist with intelligence at 
major incidents, such as earthquakes and other natural disasters.  Some TLOs are fire 










Slide depicts Arizona’s vision of the TLO field response, relationship 
with the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (CTIC) and 
incident command personnel during a major incident.  Note that 
concerned stakeholders are positioned on one side of the ACTIC and 
TLOs are positioned on the opposing side.  This slide suggests that 
concerned stakeholders have direct access to the ACTIC and are not 
directly linked to TLOs. Slide extracted from a Maricopa County 
Sheriff’s Office PowerPoint presentation.   
Figure 4.   Arizona’s Vision of the TLO Field Response57 
Whether in California or Arizona, TLOs serve primarily as information 
facilitators and operate in a “first responder” mode whenever there are major incidents. 
 
                                                 
57 Norman Beasley, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, Arizona Counterterrorism Information Center, 
www.search.org/files/ppt/Day2-Beasley.ppt (accessed December 13, 2008). 
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The reactionary nature of TLOs is described in the 2008 California State 
Homeland Security Strategy: “The Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) is the local agency 
point of contact for all terrorism-related alerts and suspicious activity reports, requests for 
information, warnings and other notifications from regional, state or federal homeland 
security agencies.”58  The strategy says nothing of utilizing TLOs in a proactive manner 
for domestic intelligence collection or infrastructure protection.   
The TLO concept, which was conceptualized and implemented by municipal 
police chiefs, does not mandate standardized skill sets or a universally accepted list of 
duties and responsibilities.  Any agency that appoints a TLO is free to create (or not 
create) its own skill set and duty criteria.  The East Bay (TEWG) website states:  “Each 
agency will ultimately determine the duties and responsibilities of their TLO(s) based on 
agency staffing and similar duties already assigned to other individuals or units.”59  The 
website also provides a list of suggested duties for TLOs.  Subsequently, there is little 
uniformity as to what TLOs actually do.  There is a basic understanding that TLOs serve 
as information facilitators; beyond that, TLO responsibilities are open to individual 
interpretations.  
 
Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) 
Suggested Duties 
 
The suggested duties include: 
 
Collecting, reporting, retrieving and sharing of materials related to terrorism. 
Such materials might include: 
• Training Bulletins 
• Information on schools and cases 
• Books, journals, periodicals and video tapes 
• Lists of official contacts  
• Source person for internal or external inquiry 
• Collecting, reporting, retrieving and sharing of terrorism 
intelligence 
• Identifying and communicating with community stakeholders 
• Contact person for community and private sector relationships 
                                                 
58 California Homeland Security Strategy, 15. 
59 East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group, www.eastbaytewg.org/tlo_position.htm, (accessed 
November 1, 2008). 
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• Conducts, coordinates and/or facilitates departmental training 
with regard to terrorism and terrorist related subjects 
• Designated agency media representative and/or spokesperson 
with respect to terrorism related information 
• Designated agency representative to the Terrorism Early 
Warning Group60 
The most common complaint relative to the TLO program is the lack of 
connection to the intelligence fusion centers.  This lack of connection encompasses both 
regional and state intelligence entities.  Because TLOs are primarily reactionary and 
spend the majority of their day working traditional law enforcement duties, they lose their 
relationship with analysts and fusion center personnel.   
Overall, the TLO concept is a good one.  It places terrorism specialists in local 
communities and streamlines the exchange of information.  TLOs provide local points-of 
contact for terrorism-related matters, and theoretically, could serve as force multipliers 
for federal and state agencies - should a federal or state agency choose to use them as 
such.  TLOs analyze local incidents, share information and assist with the intelligence 
function of incident command.  The TLO approach is a good approach if the primary goal 
of the program is simply to move information from point to point.   
3.  Implement a New Strategy 
The third alternative for America is to implement a new homeland security 
strategy - one that is collaborative in design, considers the local citizens valued partners, 
and integrates all of America’s homeland security, law enforcement, intelligence and 
military assets into a synergistic strategy.  The new strategy must be based on the over-
arching concept of “municipal homeland security” and be constructed with a bottom-up 
design that supports federal and state homeland security strategy. 
 
                                                 
60 East Bay Terrorism Early Warning Group, www.eastbaytewg.org/tlo_position.htm, (accessed 
November 1, 2008). 
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In America, there are three levels of government, but only two levels of homeland security strategy.  The 
MHSS approach is to create a foundational level of homeland security strategy that supports both national 
and state strategy.  
Figure 5.   Proposed Three Levels of Homeland Security Strategy  
A new strategy must create community-level partnerships through unity of effort, 
efficiency, flexibility, structure, and commonality across a wide spectrum of multiple 
agencies, disciplines and jurisdictions.  It must have a clear vision and mission statement 
that is equally applicable to federal, state and municipal entities of all sizes.  Finally, the 
strategy must provide specific standards, objectives, goals, and performance measures 
that are realistic and can be met by municipal police agencies and communities alike. 
This thesis asserts there is such a strategy available to homeland security policy makers.  
That strategy is entitled: Municipal Homeland Security Strategy (MHSS).   
The Municipal Homeland Security Strategy (MHSS) is a new approach to 
protecting the homeland – so new, in fact, that it completely redirects our national vision 
from federal-level entities to community-level partnerships.  The new strategy flips our 
national strategy from a decidedly federal approach to a municipal orientation.  After all, 
Thomas Ridge, former director of the department of Homeland Security, said, “…the 
homeland is not secure until the hometown is secure.”61  
 
                                                 
61 Washingtonpost.com, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/24/AR2005122400373_pf.html (accessed November 17, 2008). 
National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) 
State Homeland Security Strategy (SHSS) 
Municipal Homeland Security Strategy (MHSS) 
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The new strategy would create a nationally standardized collaborative network of 
Municipal Homeland Security Programs (MHSPs).  These programs will form the 
foundation of America’s homeland security strategy by linking every community, large 
and small, in the country.   
The MHSS is based on the municipal police community as well as the local 
citizenry.  It is not based on a single point of contact at the local law enforcement agency 
(like the TLO Program).  In this strategy, municipal police and local citizens are equal 
participants.  
This strategy is about force multiplying, local partnerships and synergy.  It 
combines all of America’s homeland security assets and regionalizes them into 
collaborative groups, based on the pre-existing jurisdictions of local district attorneys.  
Instead of police agencies looking to join anti-terrorism and homeland security groups at 
the state or federal level, America’s federal and state homeland security assets join 
municipal homeland security programs at the local level and collaboratively devise 
innovate ways to protect those communities from terrorism.  Even businesses, large and 
small, will be asked to participate in this strategy.  Municipal homeland security 
programs create shared responsibilities and are dedicated to local communities.   
By placing homeland security assets into communities, municipalities are able to 
take ownership of their situation, identify shared interests, direct homeland security assets 
































The municipal homeland security strategy is truly collaborative in design.  It integrates all of America’s 
homeland security assets into a synergistic design dedicated to individual municipalities and regions. 
Figure 6.   Municipal Homeland Security Strategy (MHSS)  
The MHSS is locally oriented and nationally applied.  It capitalizes on the concept 
of regionalization and it provides the federal government with a specific regionalized 
framework for funding.  In this strategy, the federal government transitions from lead 
homeland security entity to a support entity.   
The following standards are imperative for the strategy to be fully successful. 
• Every municipality must establish a municipal homeland security program 
and appoint at least one law enforcement officer as a Municipal Homeland 
Security Officer (MHSO).  
• The law enforcement component of a municipal homeland security 
program must be constructed upon three equally important and mutually 
supporting components - awareness, prevention and investigation - and all 
are dedicated to a single community.   
• Every municipality must establish a citizen component and appoint at least 
one person from the municipality’s administration to the MHSP.  The 
citizen component must be based on collaboration and be considered an 
equal partner in the program.  
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• Once MHSPs are operational, a municipal homeland security network 
(MHSN) must be created.  Municipal Homeland Security Networks are a 
region’s mechanism for domestic information and intelligence collection 
and dissemination.  MHSNs are organized regionally – according to the 
local district attorney’s jurisdiction.   
• MHSPs must support current federal anti-terrorism and homeland security 
programs such as the F.B.I’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).   
Similar to the Terrorism Liaison Officer Program, the MHSS appoints homeland 
security specialists within every police department in the country.  These officers are 
called Municipal Homeland Security Officers (MHSOs).  Local leaders must determine 
whether to appoint full-time or part-time municipal homeland security officers based 
upon factors such as community vulnerabilities, critical infrastructure in the community 
or adjacent community, proximity to high priority targets, and population. 
These officers are much more than terrorism-related points-of-contact.  Rather, 
they are trained professionals whose responsibilities include all matters related to 
homeland security.  MHSOs are dedicated to the local community and the immediate 
region.  They concentrate on protecting their community from terrorism and catastrophic 
accidents. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In order to secure her communities from terrorism effectively, America must 
implement a municipality-based homeland security strategy that advances the concept of 
municipal homeland security.  The strategy must have immediate utility for municipal 
police agencies and it must be constructed upon a collaborative design.  Communities are 
made safe when multiple agencies, disciplines and jurisdictions pull together and develop 
innovative protection methodologies.  Making communities safe is too complex a 





Each of the reviewed three policy alternatives has advantages and disadvantages 
for municipalities.  The purpose of this research is to identify the smartest approach for 
America’s future homeland security efforts.  Does it make sense to continue with the 
status quo?  Should we expand the TLO program into a national framework?  Or should 
we adopt a new strategy that emphasizes synergistic action at the municipal police level?  
The next chapter will help sort though these important questions. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS (ALTERNATIVES) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
“At its essence, strategy is an intellectual construct linking where you are today 
with where you want to be tomorrow in a substantive concrete manner.”62  Strategy 
serves as a bridge between vision and means. “… Strategy begins with tomorrow-the-
vision and is the process of looking back and identifying the critical paths to the 
future.”63  To be effective, a strategy must provide the necessary concepts and actions 
that must be taken to move forward an organization, army or vision.  When a strategy 
lacks vision there is seldom unified action, and little progress is accomplished.  
Subsequently, every strategy, action plan and policy option must contain a set of critical 
elements that are essential to its success.   
With this consideration in mind, each of the three alternatives (status quo, expand 
current programs, and implement new strategy) is examined for the critical imperatives.  
Imperatives are essential, and therefore, each must be present if an alternative is to have 
full utility for municipalities and municipal police agencies.  If an alternative lacks any of 
the imperatives, it would not sufficiently address the complex issues related to municipal 
homeland security.  
B. ANALYSIS 
The table below illustrates the differences among the three policy alternatives 
discussed in this thesis.  Each alternative was examined for its ability to meet the 
imperative criteria described in Chapter IV and its ability to provide municipalities with a 
comprehensive municipal homeland security strategy.  
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Figure 7.   Analysis Matrix 
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1.     Synergy Analysis  
To have synergy, a municipal homeland security strategy must integrate all 
available homeland security assets into a single design.  Strategy participants must 
depend upon each other and work together regularly and seamlessly to create an 
environment where high efficiency becomes the standard.   
All three of the alternatives require homeland security assets to work together 
with a common purpose.  However, only the municipal homeland security strategy 
advocates a municipal-level integrated approach where homeland security assets come 
together and develop innovate ways to secure a community.  The MHSS seeks to 
maximize individual asset capabilities by integrating federal, state and local entities on 
multiple levels.  In this strategy, specific roles and responsibilities are assigned 
(collectively) to homeland security assets that must be fulfilled if a community is to be 
secure.  When each asset meets its particular responsibilities, a comprehensive 
community security plan results.  Synergy emerges because federal, state and local 
homeland security assets depend upon each other (and work so closely together) in the 
MHSS.   
The concept expressed here is similar to the workings of an automobile engine.  
Each component of an engine has an important and specific function.  If a particular 
component is not performing, the engine falters, or worse, fails completely.  The MHSS 
operates on the same concept.  Each component of the MHSS has a specific function to 
fulfill.  And, each component’s effectiveness is dependent upon the other components, 
forging highly important and synergistic relationships.  In today’s complex security 
environment, synergy is a must.  Society can no longer afford to have multiple HLS 
agencies pursuing individual and uncoordinated objectives.  The MHSS is the only policy 
option that creates the opportunity for synergistic relationships to develop.   
The Terrorism Liaison Officer Program does not maximize the capabilities of 
federal and state homeland security, antiterrorism and emergency response entities.  It 
does not require TLOs, federal, state, military, intelligence, private industry, local 
government and community stakeholders to join together and develop a community 
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security plan.  The main mantra for TLOs is to receive terrorism information, then 
quickly report that information into the nearest intelligence fusion center or JTTF.  
According to interviews conducted for this research with state and municipal officials in 
California and Arizona, TLOs work primarily alone on homeland security matters as they 
receive intelligence, conduct training or perform risk analysis and threat assessments in 
their communities.   
Arizona is estimated to have approximately 190 trained TLOs.  These officers 
operate as information facilitators between the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information 
Center (ACTIC), the state’s only fusion center, and local police and fire agencies.  In 
Arizona, these officers respond to all major crimes and do not focus on terrorism.   
America needs more than the occasional assessment from a part-time terrorism 
liaison officer.  Our communities need comprehensive community security and 
intelligence plans and a unified approach to municipal homeland security.  This type of 
effort can only come from a strategy that concentrates on the municipal community and 
creates an environment where strategy participants work so closely together that synergy 
is the result.  Because there is no such effort in the TLO program, there is no opportunity 
for synergy to emerge.   
The status quo is primarily concerned with broad, overarching strategy that does 
not synergistically integrate municipalities and local police agencies into a national 
framework.  The national strategy for homeland security states, “Although we have 
substantially improved our cooperation and partnership among all levels of government, 
private and non-profit sectors, communities, and individual citizens, we must continue to 
strengthen efforts to achieve full unity of effort through a stronger and further integrated 
national approach to homeland security.”64  If the national strategy recognizes a lack of 
unity, there is certainly no homeland security synergy at the municipal level.  The status 
quo focuses primarily on sharing information and creating “information-centric”  
 
 
                                                 
64 The National Strategy for Homeland Security. 
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relationships with local entities.  Sharing information does not create synergy, is narrowly 
focused on a single aspect of homeland security and may be considered a basic 
expression of collaboration at best.   
2. Collaboration Analysis  
Imagine for a moment you are a police officer in a municipal law enforcement 
agency.  You have just been appointed as the department’s first-ever homeland security 
officer.  Your job is to secure the community from terrorists, find terrorists and those who 
support terrorism, locate all vulnerabilities that have potential to kill hundreds if not 
thousands of citizens, and implement solutions to those vulnerabilities.  You are 
instructed to build relationships with state and federal law enforcement agencies and 
acquire as much homeland security and terrorism-related information as possible.  
Finally, you are assigned the task of developing a strategy that alleviates the community’s 
fear of terrorism, and you are expected to learn about foreign cultures.    
Who, or which agency would you turn toward for advice?  Where can you learn 
all of the information you need in order to be successful at your job?  There is no school 
or class for municipal homeland security officers.  And, there are no other municipal 
homeland security officers in the communities adjacent to yours – you are the only one in 
your entire region – maybe even the state.   
The answers to these questions are only found in collaborative effort.   
Since 9/11, collaborative effort in the homeland security field has improved.  In 
the status quo option, more local police officers participate on FBI Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces (JTTFs) than ever before, there are more intelligence fusion centers in the country, 
Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATAC’s) are set-up in every state, and there are a 
plethora of electronic anti-terrorism databases available to municipal police agencies.  
However, today’s collaboration does not go far enough to secure our communities 
from 21st century terrorism.  Each JTTF has only minimal municipal police participation 
– only a handful of local officers are assigned to any one JTTF.  Local police agencies 
simply cannot afford to assign an officer on a full-time basis to a federal task force.  In 
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addition, most Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils no longer meet regularly.  One ATAC 
administrator informed this writer that his ATAC group meets only once every six 
months.  And, most of his communication with municipal police agencies occurs through 
e-mail lists.   
In communities that have instituted a Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program, 
collaboration occurs more frequently than in those communities without such a program.  
However, this research revealed that even in communities where TLOs are operational, 
collaboration is insufficient and sporadic.  Most TLOs are full-time patrol officers who 
have attended a TLO training class. The majority of their day is spent working on typical 
law enforcement duties such as patrol and criminal investigation.  Many cannot get past 
the routine demands of the day.  Their time is not spent on collaborative homeland 
security-related efforts, nor is it spent interacting with other homeland security entities.  
Therefore, collaboration takes place only out of necessity, not routine.   
In a conversation with a California municipal police chief, this researcher was 
informed that most TLOs do not have significant connectivity with their regional fusion 
center.  And, that lack of connectivity is the most common complaint regarding TLOs.  If 
the lack of connectivity is the most common complaint, and there is little collaborative 
effort taking place between TLOs and fusion centers, there is little collaboration talking 
place elsewhere.   
However, the problem is much deeper than a lack of connectivity.  The problem is 
in design, not in operations.  TLOs were intended to serve as information points-of-
contact at the local level.  By definition, collaboration is restricted to activities centering 
on terrorism information.  TLOs were designed to collaborate primarily with state and 
regional fusion centers.  If the connectivity is not abundant in the few counties that have 
TLOs, the approach will be equally ineffective if expanded to fit a national scale.   
In order to meet the definition of collaboration as defined in this research, each 
alternative must build capacity and built-out inefficiency.  Neither the status quo nor the 
TLO program meets this definition.  The TLO program may work collaboratively when  
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necessary, but does not dramatically improve agency capacity.  Collaboration must be 
routine, not occasional; it must be considered a central aspect of a strategy, not a 
peripheral aspect.    
3.  Intelligence Function Analysis 
Each alternative is examined for a municipal-level (systematic) information and 
intelligence collection methodology – referred to as I2 – that incorporates into a regional 
framework all five stages of the intelligence cycle: planning and direction, collection, 
processing, analysis and dissemination.  Collection must be a proactive process that 
involves not just a single community, but an entire region.   
Terrorists often attack a target that is close to where they live.  In fact, 44 percent 
of terrorists (all types of terrorists) attack targets that are located within 30 miles of their 
residence.65  The relatively short distance between residence and target translates into 
increased opportunity for municipal police agencies to encounter and detect terrorism.  
Consequently, suspicious incident I2 must be systematically collected, vetted to a regional 
group, analyzed at the nearest fusion center, and disseminated back to a particular region 
or community.  This must be accomplished in a timely and effective manner.  
All three alternatives identify a procedure to collect information and submit that 
data to a fusion center for analysis.  The TLO program collects information primarily 
through the efforts of TLOs, who collect pieces of information at the community level 
and submit it to the nearest fusion center.  TLOs were designed as information conduits 
and as such, their primary purpose is to facilitate the exchange of terrorism-related 
information and intelligence.  Due to the fact that most TLOs are occupied primarily with 
traditional job responsibilities, little proactive I2 collection is taking place in the 
community.  TLOs cannot proactively collect terrorism-related information when their 
primary assignment is to a patrol car with a focus on traditional crime.   
                                                 
65 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, A Look at 
Terrorist Behavior: How They Prepare and Where They Strike, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/journals/260/terrorist-behavior.htm (accessed February 20, 2008). 
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The majority of police departments do not have assigned TLOs, and the 
intelligence situation is much worse.  There is no one inside most municipal police 
departments who is specifically trained to investigate suspicious and terrorism-related 
incidents.  No one is proactively scouring police reports, public documents, or the 
community for information that could be utilized in the war on terror.  Relationships with 
federal and state terrorism officers have not been established, community anti-terrorism 
partnerships have not been created, and managers of infrastructure are still on their own 
when it comes to securing their facilities against terrorists.  To compound this problem, 
the typical police officer is a generalist who possesses a functional knowledge of a broad-
spectrum of traditional police-related topics - domestic abuse, drunken driving, theft.  
Most municipal police officers lack the basic knowledge to identify terrorism-related 
incidents, with the exception of the most obvious.   
Additionally, in the serendipitous chance a police officer does uncover terrorism-
related information, there is no well-defined system to process that data.  Most police 
officers do not know where to report suspected terrorism information.  Sadly, most police 
officers do not know anyone who works in a fusion center and most have never visited a 
fusion center.  Moreover, most fusion center analysts have never visited the communities 
in their operational area.   
Neither the status quo nor the TLO alternative offers a comprehensive strategy for 
domestic information and intelligence collection.  And neither approach supports the 
implementation of a municipal-level intelligence network similar to the one designed in 
the municipal homeland security strategy.  In fact, neither the status quo nor TLO 
approach even defines the intelligence function of municipalities or municipal police 
agencies.  Instead, collection responsibilities and the broader intelligence function at the 
municipal level are left open to individual interpretation.   
The MHSS takes a completely different approach to intelligence collection.  It 
places the municipalities and municipal police agencies at the foundation of America’s 
domestic intelligence efforts by defining the intelligence function of these entities and by 
creating regional intelligence groups known as Municipal Homeland Security Networks 
(MHSNs).  These networks are comprised of multiple jurisdictions, disciplines and 
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agencies.  A MHSN is dedicated to a particular region of the state, is based on the local 
district attorney’s jurisdiction, and incorporates (fuses) federal, state and local personnel 
– all at the municipal level.  
Unlike the TLO and status quo alternatives, the MHSS approach requires that 
MHSNs produce intelligence products such as regional intelligence plans (RIPs) and 
regional technology plans (RTPs) for particular regions of the state.  These products 
provide homeland security administrators a method to evaluate the effectiveness of a 
region’s (MHSN’s) intelligence activities.  
As the evidence indicates, the only alternative that offers municipalities a 
comprehensive methodology for information and intelligence collection is the municipal 
homeland security strategy.   
4. Roles and Responsibilities Analysis 
Each policy alternative was examined to determine if it provides the municipal 
police community with specific preventative-based homeland security roles and 
responsibilities.  Does the alternative provide guidance that directs municipal police 
homeland security activities?  Are the responsibilities of police agencies defined for 
addressing issues such as illegal immigration and infrastructure protection?  Does the 
alternative place the responsibility of community security on the municipality, state 
agencies or federal-level strategy?  This researcher asserts that a community’s security is 
best handled at the municipal level through collaborative action with state and federal 
homeland security partners.   
The status quo option is heavily dependent on federal-level action and national 
strategy.  It relies on the federal government exercising its enormous strength in 
international efforts, military action and federal law enforcement and intelligence 
initiatives.  The main problem with this approach is that al-Qaeda and other asymmetric 
threats side-step national strengths.  Terrorists don’t commit frontal attacks on strengths; 
they commit rear attacks on weaknesses.  In America, we are weakest at the community-
level.   
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The status quo option is a top-down approach to a bottom-up problem.  For most 
municipalities, this approach is akin to building a roof without first building a foundation.  
Yes, the roof may offer protection from light rain, but it won’t protect you from a storm.  
The light rain mentality creates an environment where the continued absence of specific 
roles and responsibilities for municipal law enforcement agencies is permitted to exist.    
The TLO program was designed by municipal police chiefs.  Surprisingly, this 
approach does not clearly define the homeland security responsibilities of municipal 
police agencies.  What it does define are the responsibilities of terrorism liaison officers.  
TLOs were designed to facilitate information sharing.  They were not designed to provide 
the entire municipal law enforcement community specific roles and responsibilities in 
homeland security.    
The MHSS does offer the municipal police community and municipalities specific 
homeland security-related guidance.  It creates collaborative partnerships, and then 
assigns responsibilities to those partnerships.  It requires local police agencies to become 
a community’s central homeland security entity; to devise community security and 
intelligence plans; to lead homeland security partnerships; to identify community 
vulnerabilities and the solutions to those vulnerabilities; to conduct homeland security 
awareness training; to secure infrastructure; and to become integral components of 
regional intelligence networks. 
The municipal homeland security strategy is the only policy alternative that 
provides specific homeland security-related guidance for municipal police agencies.   
5. Regionalization Analysis  
Of the three alternatives, the municipal homeland security strategy is the only 
option that specifically designed regionalization into the strategy.  In this strategy, 
municipal homeland security networks are created and serve as the primary mechanism 
for intelligence identification, collection and dissemination.  The network is comprised of 




representatives from homeland security-related agencies from every level of government.  
In addition, selected community stakeholders, such as critical infrastructure managers, 
actively participate in the security network.   
The MHSN regionalizes the homeland security assets of a particular region by 
incorporating every agency into the network.  One of the most important design aspects 
of the MHSN is that it is organized according to the local district attorney’s jurisdiction.  
This way, the local district attorney can take measure of the terrorism-related incidents 
that are discovered in his or her jurisdiction and provide legal guidance to network 
members.  Because federal agents, state police officers and fusion center personnel 
participate in the network, all capabilities of these important entities can be brought to 
bear on the region’s security.  
The regionalization of homeland security and intelligence assets brings a new 
level of detail to the homeland security mission that is simply not provided in the TLO or 
national strategy approach.  Neither of these approaches is based on regionalization and 
protecting regions of a state.  The TLO approach is to appoint a designated terrorism 
specialist at every police department and then have those individuals connect with a 
fusion center.  Beyond appointing TLOs, there is no plan to organize them into regional 
groups that work toward securing the entire region.   
Developing regional security plans is essential to securing our communities.  
Infrastructure in one community is a threat to neighboring communities.  Therefore, 
regional familiarity is essential for homeland security personnel.  The MHSS is the only 
option that considers regionalization as an essential component to community security.   
6. Vision Analysis 
The MHSS provides the municipal police community with a clear and definable 
homeland security vision.  The TLO and status quo alternatives do not.  The vision of the 
MHSS is to secure communities through the development of municipal-level, prevention-
based HLS entities.  The vision is to bring together available federal, state and local HLS 
assets and synergistically integrate those assets at the local and regional levels.  The  
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architecture of the MHSS entails participative networks, preventative action and 
encompassing multiple agencies and disciplines into a synergistic design.  No other 
policy alternative offers such a comprehensive, community-based HLS vision.    
This research discovered that in every region of the country where TLOs operate, 
the primary vision of TLOs is to facilitate the dissemination of terrorism-related 
information and intelligence (I2).  Instead of focusing on the broader mission of securing 
communities from terrorism, the TLO vision narrowly concentrates on a single aspect of 
homeland security.  In post-9/11 America, concentrating on a single aspect of HLS is 
dangerous.  The TLO design takes a keyhole approach to a panoramic issue.   
A good example of the limited nature of the TLO vision is found in a Maricopa 
County Sheriff’s Office power point presentation.  Slide 14 states, “The TLO position 
was created to relay terrorism and criminal related information/intelligence efficiently 
and appropriately between the ACTIC [Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center] 
and other agencies”66  To be effective at securing our communities from terrorism, a 
HLS-related vision must encompass more than a single aspect of HLS – it must 
encompass multiple aspects.   
While the TLO vision is too narrow to effectively secure our communities from 
terrorism, the status quo vision is too broad.  In fact, the status quo alternative offers the 
municipal police community little more than broad statements and overarching 
generalizations.  The NSHS states,  
The United States, through a concerted national effort that galvanizes the 
strengths and capabilities of Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments; 
the private and non-profit sectors; and regions, communities, and 
individual citizens – along with our partners in the international 
community – will work to achieve a secure Homeland that sustains our 
way of life as a free, prosperous, and welcoming America.”67   
How does such a broad vision statement create buy-in at the municipal level?  It does not.  
Municipal police executives and police officers cannot extract a sense of purpose from 
                                                 
66 Norman Beasley, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, Arizona Counterterrorism Information Center, 
www.search.org/files/ppt/Day2-Beasley.ppt (accessed March 3, 2008). 
67 The National Strategy for Homeland Security, 13. 
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this expansive statement.  In addition, it leads police executives to believe the federal 
government already has a plan for municipal police agencies and will be responsible for 
“galvanizing” police capabilities in America.  Simply stated, the national strategies do not 
provide a realistic vision for America’s municipal police community.  And, without 
meaningful and relative vision, there is no unified homeland security strategy.  
7. Mission Analysis 
Each policy alternative is examined for its capability to provide a HLS mission 
for municipal police agencies and municipalities.  Of the three alternatives, the MHSS is 
the alternative that best accomplishes this objective.  
The MHSS places local police agencies at the forefront of municipal homeland 
security by requiring these entities to serve as a community’s primary HLS agency.  In 
the MHSS, the local police department is responsible for a community’s HLS efforts – 
not the federal government.  The police department leads and coordinates local HLS 
effort as the MHSO and CHSO build community-level partnerships and devise 
community security plans.  The MHSS functions on collaborative networks, community 
participation, and the identification of community vulnerabilities.  All of these (and many 
more) are the responsibility of the municipal police department.  In modern America, 
municipal homeland security is the prime mission local police.   
Neither the TLO, nor the status quo alternative offers the municipal law 
enforcement community a definitive and comprehensive homeland security mission.  In 
the TLO approach, part-time officers facilitate the exchange of information and 
intelligence between fusion centers and local agencies.  While this exchange is certainly 
important to homeland security efforts, it does not define the broader police role in 
municipal homeland security.  The mission of TLOs is clearly tied to the exchange of 
information; it is not tied to the broader mandate of municipal homeland security.   
The status quo alternative fails to provide America’s most prolific homeland 
security asset, the municipal police profession, with a specific homeland security mission.  
If national or state strategy fostered a community-based approach to HLS, there would be 
more municipal police officers working HLS issues in America.  As Chapter III 
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demonstrates, there are surprisingly few municipal police officers working HLS at the 
community-level.  Therefore, it is evident the status quo alternative fails to provide a 
HLS mission for municipalities and their police departments.   
8.  Goals Analysis 
The results of the mission and goals analyses are very similar.  Neither the TLO, 
nor status quo alternatives offer substantive goals for municipal police agencies.  The 
TLO alternative’s primary goal is to facilitate the exchange of terrorism-related 
information.  It does not define specific HLS-based goals for police agencies or the 
communities that employ them.  Therefore, the TLO alternative fails to meet the criteria 
stipulated by the goals imperative.   
In the status quo alternative, the goals of municipal police departments in HLS 
strategy are not defined.  At the national level, the stated goal is to secure America from 
terrorism.  However, no national strategy offers specific HLS-related goals for municipal 
police agencies.  Therefore, the largest police profession in America is left wondering 
how they fit into national HLS strategy.  Subsequently, most police agencies leave the 
responsibility of hometown security to the federal government.   
However, at the national level there is concerted effort in the area of information 
sharing.  Every state now has at least one fusion center and the entire intelligence cycle 
continues to receive more than its far share of attention.  However, information sharing is 
just one aspect of HLS and should not constitute the majority of national effort.  
America needs specific HLS-related goals for municipal police agencies – the 
MHSS provides those goals.  In the MHSS municipal police agencies have specific goals: 
establish MHSPs and MHSNs, identify community and regional vulnerabilities, create 
community security, intelligence and technology plans, secure local infrastructure, 
identify and incorporate community stakeholders into MHSPs and MHSNs, conduct HLS 
training with MHSOs, CHSOs and other strategy participants, develop methodologies 
that target crimes that support terrorism and many others.  No other alternative provides 
such specificity when it comes to municipal-level HLS.   
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9. Proactive Prevention Analysis 
This imperative is based on offensive action and forward thinking.  It means that 
homeland security professionals are actively working on terrorism and  homeland 
security issues - safe houses, fraudulent document operations, illegal aliens, people and 
crimes that support terrorism, community vulnerabilities, loopholes in security measures, 
infrastructure weaknesses, dangerous business practices, inefficiency in investigation 
methods and any vulnerability that may enable or benefit terrorists.   
The municipal homeland security strategy is based on proactive action that is 
geared solely toward prevention, not response.  The strategy stipulates that municipal 
homeland security officers spend a portion of their day, everyday, working toward 
finding people, events and procedures that can hurt a community.  The MHSS creates an 
environment where its officers are placed in advantageous positions to detect terrorism by 
interacting with community stakeholders, learning business practices, participating in 
community groups, conducting community awareness training and reviewing public 
information documents.  MHSOs also participate in ATAC events and serve as force 
multipliers for JTTFs.   
The TLO approach to terrorism is primarily reactionary in design.  While 
preventative effort begins when a lead is detected or supplied to by a source, most TLOs 
are not actively seeking out terrorism-related matters throughout the day.  A member of a 
California Terrorism Early Warning Group informed this researcher that most TLOs are 
busy during their normal workday handling typical duty demands, mostly associated with 
patrol.  If they encounter a terrorism-related incident, they will investigate.  But, they are 
not in the community on a daily basis concentrating on homeland security matters, 
including prevention.   
The TLO approach is decidedly reactionary in design and leaves enormous 
loopholes in our communities for terrorists to exploit.  Until TLOs spend at least a 
portion of their day actively investigating terrorism and planning for prevention, this 
approach will continue to be reactionary and response oriented.  
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The status quo offers very little as far as proactive prevention is concerned.  Most 
municipalities, emergency responders and local law enforcement agencies continue to 
orient on response.  In June 2004, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland 
Security stated, “The committee is concerned that while terrorism prevention is a national 
priority, little is being done to create prevention expertise in our nation’s first responders.  
This is in stark contrast to response and recovery training programs.  Without a well-
developed terrorism prevention plan, state and local agencies lack a key piece in the fight 
against terrorism.”68 
Our country has always been response oriented.  One reason for our national 
tunnel vision is that response is much easier to evaluate than prevention.  It is also big 
business for companies to sell response-oriented equipment and training materials.  Dr. 
Christopher Bellavita, in his article, “What is Preventing Homeland Security?” asks, “Has 
anyone seen the terrorism prevention plan?”69  The short answer is this: No we haven’t 
seen it, and we’re unlikely to, as long as response continues to dominate our national 
mindset.  
10. Bottom-Up Design Analysis 
Of the three policy options available to homeland security policy makers, the 
MHSS is the only strategy that is designed with a comprehensive bottom-up design.  This 
strategy places municipalities, municipal law enforcement agencies and other strategy 
participants (such as civic leaders, average citizens, and business leaders) at the base of 
the strategy.  In this approach, all homeland security entities support the municipal 
homeland security program at the local level.  Participants (federal, state, local, citizen) 
come to the municipality and work with the municipal homeland security officer and the 
community security officer.  The entire strategy is based on the municipal community.  
                                                 
68 Committee Report accompanying the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2005, 
HR 4567, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&report=hr541&dbname=cp108& (accessed November 
17, 2008). 
69 Christopher Bellavita, “What is Preventing Homeland Security?” Homeland Security Affairs 1, no. 
1, art. 3, (2005). 
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The TLO program is also based on a bottom-up design, but unlike the MHSS, the 
TLO design is not comprehensive.  It consists mostly of TLOs and fusion center 
personnel.  This approach is heavily dependent on law enforcement and intelligence 
personnel and limits participation of the citizenry and business leaders.  In addition, the 
TLO concept is too narrowly focused on information sharing.  As a result, the majority of 
TLO responsibilities turn on sharing information and establishing information conduits 
where information flows more readily.  In a modern and nuclear world, homeland 
security involves significantly more than sharing information.  It involves creating and 
maintaining a comprehensive system of layered protection for the municipal community.  
The status quo alternative offers very little by way of a bottom-up design.  There 
is no national prevention plan or national strategy that places the municipality’s security 
in its own hands.  Instead, the current national strategies focus on broad strategy as they 
devise targeted approaches to improve information sharing and allocating homeland 
security funding. 
A bottom-up design is unique and requires that homeland security agencies adopt 
a new way of thinking and operating.  The federal government is at times innovative, but 
in this regard, it is not meeting even a minimum standard.  
11. Affordability Analysis  
America is experiencing historic financial turmoil.  The faltering economy affects 
our nation’s homeland security efforts in a myriad ways.  Municipalities and law 
enforcement agencies are placed under financial strain as they attempt to accomplish 
more with less, and in many cases, simply attempt to maintain with less.  
Yet, our homeland security efforts must continue.  Municipal police agencies 
must find a way to protect their communities from terrorism while not creating additional 
financial hardships.  The municipal homeland security strategy takes into account the 
increased financial pressure that law enforcement agencies are experiencing and offers a 
realistic solution.   
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The MHSS, similar to the TLO strategy, requires municipal law enforcement 
agencies to appoint at least one person who is already on staff as a homeland security 
specialist.  These specialists are called Municipal Homeland Security Officers (MHSOs) 
and are appointed either on a part-time or full-time basis.   
The strategy requires that all MHSOs spend a portion of their day (everyday) 
working on homeland security-related issues – not just terrorism.  In the case of a part-
time MHSO, he or she may spend only an hour or two working on securing the 
community.  These officers are responsible for all matters related to homeland security 
and terrorism prevention, and duties include the following. 
• Collect suspicious incident, terrorism and homeland security-related 
intelligence 
• Identify, collect and investigate leads 
• Create relationships with citizens and members of the business 
community; 
• Identify vulnerabilities by conducting vulnerability and risk assessments; 
• Develop school emergency plans 
• Conduct homeland security-related training 
In summary, MHSOs work homeland security everyday – even if it is only for a 
few hours. 
The strategy is made affordable because it requires only a few hours each day of 
the MHSO’s time.  And, time is available if municipal agencies adopt homeland security 
as a core mission. “On the average, about 5 hours of an officer’s 8-hour shift are spent at 
the officer’s discretion, while 3 hours are spent on assigned tasks.”70     
Unlike the TLOs, MHSOs are not alone in the awesome responsibility of 
protecting a community from terrorism.  The MHSS takes a collaborative approach 
toward municipal homeland security by creating partnerships and incorporating federal, 
state and citizen expertise into the strategy.  When responsibility is shared in this manner,  
 
                                                 
70 National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=83392 (accessed October 7, 2008). 
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so are the costs of protecting the community.  Using this approach, multiple agencies 
work on developing community security plans and regional intelligence plans.  No one 
agency shoulders the entire cost of protection.  
The current strategy of protecting the community is decentralized and fragmented.  
And, there is no discernable plan to develop the concept of municipal homeland security.  
Therefore, no one agency has taken the lead in this important area.  This means that 
whenever there is an increase in the Homeland Security Advisory System, municipalities 
shoulder the majority of costs.  Because there is no community security plan in place 
when the advisory level increases, municipal police departments do what they have 
always done – hire overtime officers.  Without a plan, these officers usually stand at an 
assigned post until the advisory level is lowered, or (in some cases) the overtime money 
runs out.  Either way, the municipality is paying for temporary homeland security that is 
costly in more ways than one.   
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The analysis chapter demonstrates that both the TLO and status quo options are 
not effective at meeting 21st century demands for homeland security strategy.  If we 
expect HLS strategy to be effective at protecting our communities from terrorists, we 
must design strategy that fosters synergy.  In addition, homeland security strategy must 
spread the responsibility of domestic security across multiple disciplines, jurisdictions 
and agencies.  America’s HLS assets must work together to secure from terrorists our 
hometown infrastructure, businesses, schools, public events, transportation systems and 
many other components of modern society.   
There are conception, design, implementation, evaluation, training, prevention, 
planning, operational, legal, administrative, technological and many other issues to 
consider relative to homeland security effort.  No one agency or level of government can 
effectively accomplish all of these tasks.  Preventing terrorism in modern times is a 
remarkably difficult task, but it can be accomplished with comprehensive, preventative-
based HLS strategy.  The MHSS is the strategy we need to address today’s – and 
tomorrow’s – threats.  
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The status quo and TLO alternative each have their positive aspects.  The status 
quo alternative is heavy with federal-level action and national strategy.  Any country that 
seeks to address modern day terrorism today must have federal-level leadership.  Federal 
agencies must do their part to counter terrorism in their own areas of responsibility, but 
they must also work closely (synergistically) with municipalities to secure hometown 
America.  This is the principal difference between the status quo alternative and the 
MHSS.  In the status quo, federal level agencies continue to view terrorism through the 
lens of their own glasses.  And, they’re looking primarily at their own areas of 
responsibility.  This leaves the majority of municipalities and municipal police agencies 
on their own.  Yes, there is collaboration between federal entities and local police, but the 
collaboration is limited, sporadic and not nearly comprehensive enough to provide 
effective and lasting HLS effort.   
The TLO alternative provides a mechanism for police departments to collect and 
exchange information.  As the analysis points out, the parameters of the TLO design are 
narrow and too focused on a single aspect of HLS – information.  This narrow field of 
vision leaves the other aspects of HLS vulnerable and neglected.  And that can be 
dangerous for Americans.  It does not make sense to rely upon a strategy that is primarily 
concerned with information exchange when the enemy is doing everything within its 
ability to hide information from us. 
The MHSS addresses numerous HLS issues, assigns HLS responsibility to 
collaborative partnerships, creates synergy, and is adaptable to any community, region or 
situation.  It supports current federal and state HLS efforts, provides community 
awareness and offers a mechanism to train intelligence analysts employed by federal, 
state and regional fusion centers.  It maximizes the abilities of multiple agencies, 
disciplines and specialties and it is focused on the community.  One of the best 
characteristics of the MHSS is that it focuses all of America’s homeland security assets at 
the community level – not the federal or state level.  
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VI. MUNICIPAL HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY (MHSS) 
A. INTRODUCTION  
As a country, America can do better at protecting herself at home.  We can create 
and implement a national strategy that integrates all of America’s homeland security 
assets into a single synergistic design.  Homeland security, intelligence, military, law 
enforcement, business, and community entities can work collaboratively – at the 
community level – with the common purpose of protecting the citizenry where we live, 
work and play.   
By developing community-level homeland security networks, we construct a 
prevention-oriented strategy that brings all of America’s assets to bear on our collective 
security.  The purpose of this approach is to build unification and commonality across 
multiple disciplines, while simultaneously placing the municipality and municipal police 
department at the forefront of America’s homeland security efforts.  After all, terrorists 
do not seek to attack our military strengths; they plan to attack our citizens and 
infrastructures – in our communities.   
The Municipal Homeland Security Strategy (MHSS) is a new approach to 
homeland security that supports current homeland security, intelligence, defense, and 
counterterrorism efforts.  Abandoning current security programs is not necessary.  This 
strategy is designed to enhance existing efforts – not render them irrelevant.  In addition, 
the financial costs of implementing this approach are minimal.  In many cases, it requires 
the appointment of a homeland security point-of-contact (full-time or part-time), and a 
few hours of that person’s time each day.    
The municipal homeland security strategy is, in this writer’s opinion, America’s – 
and certainly a local community’s – greatest asset in the war on terrorism.  This strategy 
is  localized, dedicated to a single purpose, based on a community policing construct, and 
has the potential to save countless lives and millions of dollars in economic property.  
Through the implementation of the municipal homeland security strategy, the local 
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community – with the assistance of federal agencies and other homeland security assets – 
becomes the primary caretaker of their own security.  The single most important aspect of 
this strategy is that it is based on prevention, not response.  
In 1862, President Abraham Lincoln aptly stated, “As our case is new, so we must 
think anew and act anew.”71  The homeland security strategy presented in this research is 
a sensible and new approach that places our nation’s security in the hands of a communal 
network.  The adage, “It takes a network to fight a network,” aptly applies to the MHSS 
approach.  
B. THE STRATEGY’S (DETAILED) DESCRIPTION  
The strategy is to create a nationally standardized collaborative network of 
Municipal Homeland Security Programs (MHSPs).  These programs will form the 
foundation of America’s domestic security strategy by organizing communities into 
mutually-supportive regional networks.  The following standards are imperative for the 
strategy to be fully successful: 
• Every municipality must establish a Municipal Homeland Security 
Program and appoint at least one officer as a Municipal Homeland 
Security Officer (MHSO).  Local police executives must determine 
whether to appoint full-time or part-time municipal homeland security 
officers based upon factors such as community vulnerabilities, critical 
infrastructure in the community or adjacent community, proximity to high 
priority targets, and population. 
• Every municipality must appoint at least one member of the community’s 
administration as a Community Homeland Security Officer (CHSO).  The 
CHSO works closely with the MHSO and together these officers are 
responsible for leading and coordinating the community’s security and 
prevention plans.  
• Municipal Homeland Security Programs must be constructed upon three 
equally important and mutually supporting components: awareness, 
prevention and investigation, and all are dedicated to a single community.   
 
 
                                                 
71 The Cognitive Edge, http://www.cognitive-
edge.com/blogs/dave/2008/10/the_dogmas_of_the_quiet_past_1.php (accessed November 17, 2008). 
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• Once MHSPs are operational, a municipal homeland security network is 
created. The municipal homeland security network (MHSN) is regionally 
organized according to the local district attorney’s jurisdiction and serves 
as the region’s mechanism for domestic information and intelligence 
collection and dissemination.   
• MHSPs support current homeland security-related programs, such as the 
F.B.I’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces, U.S. Attorney’s Anti-Terrorism 
Advisory Councils and other pre-existing federal and state anti-terrorism 
efforts.  
• Each MHSP must support the collaborative operational design of the 
MHSS.  In the MHSS, all homeland security assets come together at the 
municipal level and construct innovate strategies to secure the 
municipality.  Community stakeholders and other selected community 
members (managers of critical infrastructures, school administrators, etc.) 
not only participate, but are considered critical components in their 
community’s MHSP and their region’s MHSN.  
The intent of municipal homeland security strategy is to accomplish far more than 
investigating terrorism.  This strategy is designed to bring the local community and 
municipal police departments to the forefront of America’s homeland security efforts by 
creating a comprehensive homeland security strategy that is based upon prevention.  
MHSPs are collaborative networks that are comprised of not only local police officers 
(MHSOs), but also community stakeholders, federal and state law enforcement and 
intelligence officers, military personnel, citizens, managers of infrastructure, private 
business employees, district attorneys, state and local agencies, school departments, 
community groups and any other person or entity that can positively contribute to a 
community’s, or region’s, domestic security.  
These programs are standardized, coordinated, inexpensive, and focus on 
awareness, prevention and investigation.  They bring civilian, law enforcement, military 
and intelligence communities together through the implementation of a collaborative 
network strategy designed to counter emerging 21st century transnational and domestic 
asymmetric threats.  Municipal Homeland Security Programs are the community policing 
programs of the future.    
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1. Awareness Component 
In the United States, Americans spend approximately 620 billion each year on 
advertising.  Nearly every magazine, newspaper, television show or business is supported 
to some extent by advertising dollars.  There are billboards, posters, radio and television 
commercials, signs of all sizes, directed mailings; even the Internet is inundated with 
advertising.  Americans are bombarded by advertisements on a daily basis - on our 
highways, in our homes, at work, on vacation, and even when we eat. (Take a minute to 
read your cereal box).  In fact, it is estimated that Americans “encounter from 3,500 to 
5,000 marketing messages per day, vs. 500 to 2,000 in the 1970s.”72  
It is difficult to escape the advertisers’ onslaught.   
Yet, where is the advertising division of the Department of Homeland Security?  
How does the federal government ensure the citizenry is informed (dare I say educated) 
to the dangers and realism of terrorism?  Do our national strategies have an awareness 
component?  Do Americans know the signs of terrorism and where to look for them?  Do 
the majority of police officers know the signs of terrorism?  The answers to these 
questions are an emphatic – no.  There is no national campaign to make people aware of 
terrorism or the signs of terrorism; (unless you classify the Homeland Security Alert 
System as a national awareness campaign.)  We only hear of occasional arrests and 
thwarted terrorism plots after the fact.  This is not prevention-oriented marketing or 
education, and we are not capitalizing on the force-multiplying effect the citizenry and 
our police officers can offer to our homeland security efforts.   
Trained citizens, sensitive facility employees and law enforcement officers are 
America’s most prolific anti-terrorism force multipliers.  They are the eyes and ears of 
our communities.  Yet, these important resources are not organized into collaborative 
partnerships.  Subsequently, they sit idol on America’s homeland security sidelines, not 
knowing what activities or which people in their communities may be linked to terrorism.  
The majority of business and infrastructure employees are not trained to detect suspicious 
                                                 
72 USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com/money/advertising/adtrack/2005-06-19-cannes-box_x.htm 
(accessed October 30, 2008). 
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activity at their own facilities.  If they did “by-chance” discover a suspicious incident, 
many do not know to whom to report the incident.  The awareness component addresses 
all of these issues.    
The awareness component contains two sub-sections: public and private.  The 
division is necessary because there are specific awareness factors that one group 
(private/law enforcement) should be made aware of while the other group 
(public/citizens, employees, etc.) should not.  Consider electric-generating power plants, 
for example.  At these facilities – and every other critical infrastructure – there are 
specific locations that are particularly vulnerable to attack.  The so-called “switch yard” 
is the most vulnerable at electric-generating power plants.  A switch yard stores generated 
electricity before it is sent into the electric grid.  If a terrorist or disgruntled employee 
decided to target a switchyard, the plant could very easily be knocked off the grid, 
causing either a brown-out or full-fledged blackout.  Switch yards are especially 
vulnerable because they are usually outside the main building, surrounded only by a 
chain link fence and not otherwise protected.   
Knowing a facility’s particular vulnerability is called “site familiarity.”  In the 
case of a power plant, police officers – certainly municipal homeland security officers – 
should be familiar with the switch yard and its significance to the plant, the community 
and the regional area.  However, members of the general community should not be made 
aware of the plant’s vulnerabilities for obvious security reasons. 
In the MHSS, the MHSOs receive site familiarity training at every sensitive 
facility and vulnerability inside the community.  In some instances, entire MHSNs 
receive awareness training – along with representatives (analysts) from the nearest state 
or regional fusion center.  This raises the collective knowledge and investigative ability 
of an entire region.   
To further illustrate the importance of the awareness component, imagine the 
police department receives a report of a suspicious male outside the power plant taking 
pictures of the switch yard.  If that department did not have a municipal homeland 
security program, none of the police officers would have “site familiarity” and therefore, 
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would likely not recognize the significance of this report.  On the other hand, if this 
incident occurred in a community that had a municipal homeland security program and 
conducted awareness training, every patrol officer working that day should immediately 
recognize the significance of the report and the need to investigate quickly and 
thoroughly.  In addition, if this incident took place at a power plant where the employees 
and adjacent citizenry received awareness training, it is very likely this activity would 
have been detected at the beginning of the incident, rather than toward the end. 
We increase our chances of successfully detecting suspicious incidents when 
municipal homeland security officers conduct awareness training with community 
members.  Private and public employees, community and neighborhood groups, private 
security forces, hospital staffs, school staffs, apartment building managers, bus drivers, 
mailmen – and nearly every organized community group is a candidate for awareness 
training.  Members of the community become the eyes and ears of municipal homeland 
security programs.    
Sadly, most of America’s municipal, state and federal law enforcement agencies 
do not conduct site familiarity awareness training.  Many law enforcement officers at 
every level of government lack specific knowledge of critical infrastructure 
vulnerabilities in the communities where they are employed.  In my experiences as a 
professional law enforcement officer (assigned to homeland security for seven years), I 
met law enforcement officers, some of whom have been employed in the same 
community for more than 25 years, who did not possess even a basic level of site 
familiarity with the infrastructures and schools in their community.  This is particularly 
disconcerting as it is exactly these vulnerabilities terrorists are seeking to identify and 
attack.  Without a high level of site familiarity, it is virtually impossible for a police 
department, or any law enforcement agency, to adequately protect – in a preventative 
way – their community or infrastructure from terrorism.   
a. Intelligence Analysts and Awareness Training  
Intelligence analysts are another group that derives significant benefit 
from awareness training.  Many analysts lack operational field experience and therefore 
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do not have site familiarity knowledge of the businesses, infrastructures and other 
vulnerable localities they often read about and analyze.  Through the MHSS, analysts can 
attend the same awareness training as police officers and employees of vulnerable 
facilities.  By attending awareness training, analysts become familiar with a particular site 
(and similar sites), and listen firsthand to employees who talk about their experiences. 
The analysts gain valuable institutional knowledge, and learn specifics about the number, 
frequency and types of suspicious incidents at a facility.  Most important, they establish 
contacts and build relationships with employees of the facility, municipal homeland 
security officers, and other members of the community.  Site familiarity awareness is a 
mission essential task of intelligence analysts; the MHSS helps analysts fulfill that 
mission.      














































Municipal Homeland Security Programs are constructed upon 
three equally important and mutually supporting components: 
awareness, prevention and investigation, and all are dedicated 
to a single municipality. 
Figure 8.   Three Components of a Municipal Homeland Security Program 
2. Prevention Component 
Prevention is the key to America’s homeland security strategy.  Yet, the 
prevailing mindset and approach to homeland security has been primarily from a position 
of response.  Millions of dollars and even greater amounts of time have been spent on 
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response-oriented activities such as purchasing equipment and conducting response-
oriented training exercises.  Even our national strategies focus primarily on response.  
Those who practice response argue that America has an enormous need to improve 
emergency response procedures.  They point to the problems first-responders experienced 
in New York City when the World Trade Towers were attacked in 2001 and to the 
problems encountered in Louisiana after hurricane Katrina struck.  While there is no 
doubt effective response strategies save lives, it is plainly evident that effective 
prevention strategies save even more lives.  
Nevertheless, as a country we continue to focus on response.  In June 2004, the 
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security stated, “The Committee is 
concerned that DHS agencies are not placing top priority on their homeland security 
missions set forth in the Homeland Security Act, but are in some cases giving more 
weight to less urgent, legacy activities.”73  
Our country has always been response-oriented.  One reason for our national 
tunnel vision is that response is much easier to evaluate than prevention.  It is also big 
business for companies to sell response-oriented equipment and training materials.  Dr. 
Christopher Bellavita, of the Naval Postgraduate School observed, “We have been at this 
longer than WWII, and we still do not have a cohesive – or articulated – national 
prevention strategy.  Something is wrong.”74  Yes, something is wrong, but there is hope.   
Municipal Homeland Security Programs are designed to shift our national thought 
process from response to prevention.  In fact, the entire MHSS strategy is designed with 
prevention as its main objective.  Through a municipal homeland security program, 
MHSOs and CHSOs have the responsibility to develop their community’s prevention 
plan.  The plan is tailored to their city or town and designed with that community’s 
unique vulnerabilities in mind.  MHSOs and CHSOs don’t write the community 
prevention plan on their own; rather, it’s a collaborative effort, incorporating input from 
community stakeholders, business and infrastructure mangers, emergency planners, 
                                                 
73 House Appropriations Subcommittee. 
74 Christopher Bellavita, “What is Preventing Homeland Security?” Homeland Security Affairs I, no. 
1, art. 3 (Summer 2005). 
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facility security officers, government officials, school and fire department personnel, and 
anyone else so identified.  The prevention plan includes all aspects of terrorism 
prevention and can even go so far as addressing the location and construction of new 
bomb-resistant public (or private) buildings.  The plan addresses and develops preventive 
countermeasures for potential targets such as high-rise apartment buildings, hazardous 
material storage and transports, critical infrastructures, school graduations, concerts, 
sporting events, festivals, holiday celebrations, and any other community vulnerability.   
By developing community prevention plans (in addition to response plans), we 
are taking important first steps toward the adoption of new philosophy.  This new, 21st 
century philosophy centers on preventing and circumventing terrorism, not mainly on 
responding after it occurs.  Municipal Homeland Security Programs force people – an 
entire community - to change their thinking from response to prevention.   
3. Investigation Component 
The investigation component consists of two sub-sections: preliminary 
investigation and follow-up investigations.  When a municipal police department operates 
a MHSP, the MHSO has the responsibility to conduct the preliminary (homeland 
security-related) investigation whenever possible.  The follow-up investigation must 
always be conducted by the MHSO.  By restricting suspicious activity and terrorism-
related cases to MHSOs, we find that case information is centralized, analyzed and 
processed through a more detailed and efficient investigative process.  In addition, as 
MHSOs conduct homeland security-related investigations, they become increasingly 
educated in the domestic security field.  Subsequently, a cadre of experienced homeland 
security investigators is created at the municipal level, and the force multiplies. 
Today, when a police department receives information that a suspicious incident 
is taking place at an important facility, the standard response is to dispatch the nearest 
patrol officer.  This officer typically assumes full responsibility for conducting the entire 
preliminary investigation.  He or she usually has little or no anti-terrorism training and is 
not familiar with the unique characteristics, or site familiarity, of the facility. This lack of 
training correlates into missed opportunity for the police department (and broader 
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America) to detect terrorism and protect their community.  Vital information is not 
collected that might have proven central to a terrorism investigation.  Officers who are 
not trained in terrorism investigation are not typically capable of identifying behaviors, 
patterns, events and indicators that are possibly related to terrorism.   
To make matters worse, when a police officer collects information at a suspicious 
incident, the information is usually recorded on that department’s standardized form, 
reviewed by a superior officer (possibly), and then eventually filled among thousands of 
other police reports.  This information will remain in the department’s computer database 
(or filing cabinet) without ever being separated, categorized, analyzed, or otherwise 
processed.  Reports like these become “lost in the matrix” and do not help America’s 
homeland security efforts.  
Under the municipal homeland security strategy model, however, an MHSO 
responds to the scene and investigates suspicious incidents as they unfold.  He or she 
assumes full responsibility for the preliminary and follow-up investigations.  Case 
information is centrally located in a Department of Homeland Security-linked computer.  
Suspicious activity reports are completed on standardized MHSS forms and submitted in 
a nationally standardized format and timeline.  (Initial reports, either completed or 
incomplete, are submitted within 24 hours of the incident being reported to a MHSO.)  
Local and state law enforcement agencies – the MHSPs – use exactly the same forms for 
terrorism-related reports and submit these to the Department of Homeland Security, Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and the nearest fusion center via a secure computer 
network.  These reports can be viewed by anyone authorized to access the network.  State 
fusion centers, intelligence agencies, federal agencies and every municipal homeland 
security officer will have immediate access to the information.   
None of this can happen if police departments do not begin designating officers as 
municipal homeland security officers.  There continues to be widespread resistance on 
behalf of the municipal police community in this critical area.  Many police executives 
completely ignore the reorganization of the federal government to create the Department 
of Homeland Security and the FBI’s significant mission realignment toward 
counterterrorism.  These police executives either refuse or fail to recognize the significant 
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role a local terrorism specialist can play in a community’s security.  This is surprising, 
especially when the law enforcement profession has typically agreed that specialists are 
far more effective at investigating specific crimes than conventional patrol officers.  In 
fact, nearly every police department in America has some type of specialist among its 
ranks.  There are narcotic officers, sexual assault investigators, accident 
reconstructionists, anti-drug officers, school resources officers, and so forth.  Yet, few 
departments have terrorism specialists.  The municipal police profession is clearly 
lagging behind in this regard.   
One highly trained terrorism specialists is a more thorough investigator than an 
entire department of non-trained generalists.  Specialization in homeland security will 
greatly enhance both preliminary and follow-up investigations because the investigator is 
trained in terrorism-related topics such as explosive recognition, surveillance techniques 
and technologies, foreign name recognition, fraudulent documents, immigration 
procedures, foreign terrorist organizations and their tactics, domestic terrorist groups, 
world geography, foreign cultures and religious customs.  This training correlates into 
increased opportunities for detection.  Better quality investigations combined with 
increased standardization facilitates early detection efforts.  And, early detection is the 
hallmark of prevention.   
C. GOVERNING STRUCTURE 
In the United States, there are a number of task forces at the municipal level 
addressing a spectrum of issues.  There are drug, auto, gang, and violent crime task 
forces, many funded by the federal government and comprised of police officers and 
agents from multiple law enforcement, intelligence and homeland security-related 
agencies.  Task force members meet regularly to plan strategy, conduct training, 
exchange ideas and perform mission-related business.  The task force concept is not new 
to the American law enforcement community.   
Administratively, each municipality’s MHSP and the MHSN is governed by three 
individuals: the state’s director of homeland security, the police chief of that jurisdiction 
(MHSP only) and the district attorney for the region.  These three individuals work 
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collaboratively to ensure the MHSP accomplishes its stated mission, meets federal and 
state standards, and operates within the boundaries of federal and state laws as well as 
Department of Homeland Security guidelines.  The chief of police meets regularly with 
the district attorney to discuss state and local laws, crimes that support terrorism and 
collection initiatives.   
MHSPs operate in the same manner as a task force.  In the case of the MHSN, the 
police department with the greatest amount of critical infrastructure within the MHSN’s 
jurisdiction will take on the administrative duties for the network.  This department 
serves as the lead agency for the MHSN’s administration and is responsible for 
coordination, equipment purchases, grant applications and overall operation of the 
MHSN.   
The local district attorney provides criminal law-related guidance to MHSOs and 
members of the MHSN, while the state’s director of homeland security serves as the 
MHSNs governing authority and has final approval and supervisory control over the 
activities of a MHSP and MHSN.  The MHSNs administrative authority (the 
aforementioned police department) is responsible for submitting the MHSN’s Regional 
Intelligence Plan (RIP) and Regional Technology Plan (RTP) for the network.  These 
plans are submitted to the director of homeland security for approval.  This ensures the 
director knows exactly what intelligence efforts are occurring in his or her state.   
Instead of being funded by state monies, MHSNs request and receive funding 
directly from the Department of Homeland Security.  Funding requests are constructed 
upon the same criteria the Department of Homeland Security uses in its Homeland 
Security Grant Program, which are “…risk-based analysis and regional security 
cooperation.”75  Most importantly, funding is based on demonstrated need, not political 
wrangling.  Every MHSN will be required to articulate how homeland security funds will 
be spent and how the technologies purchased will help to secure the MHSN jurisdiction 
from terrorists, the crimes that support terrorism, and terrorism-related suspicious 
activities.  
                                                 
75 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Grant Program Guidelines, 3. 
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
In 1776, Benjamin Franklin said “We must all hang together, or most assuredly 
we shall all hang separately.”76  These words have as much meaning for today’s 
homeland security community as they did hundreds of years ago for our founding fathers.  
Individual effort at any level of government or discipline has no place in America’s 
homeland security strategy.  In similar fashion to the efforts put forth by our founding 
fathers, America’s homeland security community must stand united, work synergistically, 
and build comprehensive HLS policy.  This can best be accomplished through the 
implementation of strategy that creates unified action; the MHSS creates unity.   
The MHSS is designed with a single purpose – to protect the American homeland.  
This strategy integrates resources, community members, technologies and prevention 
strategies into a collaborative homeland security network that is dedicated to protecting 
the homeland at the community and regional level.  The three components – awareness, 
prevention and investigation – serve to focus the efforts of MHSOs, CHSOs and other 
HLS personnel as they go about the responsibility of preventing terrorism and securing 
their communities from catastrophic accident.   
The MHSS is flexible enough to allow for variances in community size, 
complexity, personnel, equipment and technologies.  Yet, the strategy offers the right 
amount of standardization to create uniformity across regions and states – even the 
country.  Every MHSP will be similarly designed, but each will possess the unique 
characteristics of its specific community.  This “adaptability” enables police agencies of 
all sizes to work together and benefit from each other as never before.  For example, 
police agencies that cannot afford to assign a staff member to a federal task force are now 
able to participate in regional HLS networks (MHSNs) and thereby, receive the same 
information and intelligence task force members receive. (MHSN members receive 
security clearances.) 
 
                                                 
76 Principles of Freedom, http://research.history.org/pf/signers/ (accessed November 17, 2008). 
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The lessons our founding fathers learned relative to the unity of effort, economy 
of force and force multiplication must be applied to HLS strategy.  If we fail to apply 
these lessons, America will likely suffer additional terror attacks, and regretfully, we may 
suffer the gravest attack of all – a nuclear attack on American soil.  Unsynchronized 
individual effort cannot effectively address every aspect of homeland security; we must 
have unity if we are to effectively protect our citizens.  The MHSS is the only option that 
creates and fosters unity. United we survive.  
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VII. HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICERS (MHSOS) AND (CHSOS) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The officers assigned to a municipal homeland security program are designated as 
municipal homeland security officers (MHSOs) and community homeland security 
officers (CHSOs).  Municipalities will have (at least) one full-time or part-time MHSO 
and at least one part-time CHSO.  Preferably, most police departments will appoint (as a 
minimum) one full-time MHSO.  However, in some instances this may not be possible.  
Some departments do not have the personnel to dedicate one officer as a full-time 
homeland security specialist.  In these situations, a part-time MHSO appointment is 
necessary.  The intention is that every police department appoints at least one MHSO.  
Certainly, every department can appoint one officer to serve as a part-time MHSO 
without incurring a significantly negative impact on the department. 
Municipalities also appoint at least one member of a community’s administration 
as a community homeland security officer (CHSO).  This civilian asset works 
collaboratively with the MHSO on community-oriented homeland security matters.  The 
CHSO serves as a bridge between the municipality’s administration and the MHSP’s 
security efforts.   
B. MUNICIPAL HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICERS (MHSOS)  
Municipal homeland security officers have enormous responsibilities.  They are 
much more than terrorism or suspicious incident investigators.  They become a 
community’s point of contact for all matters related to homeland security.  These officers 
specialize in terrorism prevention, awareness and investigation.  They serve as a 
department’s point of contact for the federal and state government, military, and 
intelligence communities as they receive, disseminate and exchange homeland security-




and other federal and state homeland security investigations as required.  MHSOs are 
force multipliers for America’s current homeland security and anti-terrorism federal and 
state agents.    
MHSOs proactively identify and eliminate community vulnerabilities, protect 
vital infrastructures from attack, conduct public and private awareness training, and 
become that expert on everything from transnational terrorist organizations to school 
prevention plans.  Their mission is to protect their community from terrorists and other 
like-minded individuals.  They are dedicated to a single community, organized regionally 
and guided by a single purpose – to protect their community from terrorism and the 
crimes that support terrorism.  These officers form a collaborative network of homeland 
security-first preventors, investigators and responders – the MHSN – dedicated solely to 
that region.    
In addition, MHSOs have the following responsibilities. 
• To lead the municipal homeland security program’s efforts to protect the 
community from terrorism and catastrophic accident 
• To identify community vulnerabilities and implement solutions to those 
vulnerabilities.  This includes working with and learning infrastructure 
operational practices, procedures and employees.  This is the primary 
responsibility of MHSOs. 
• To work collaboratively with the CHSO and design community safe 
projects that take into account security measures and homeland security 
issues 
• To ensure the proactive and timely identification, collection, processing 
and dissemination of homeland security and terrorism-related information 
and intelligence.  (Intelligence Function)   
• To design systematic methodologies that identifies potential homeland 
security information.  Reviewing local marriage certificates for fraudulent 
marriages is one example where municipal homeland security officers can 
uses public source information to detect potential terrorism information.  
• To establish and maintain lines of communication with federal and state 
homeland security and terrorism entities.  (Relationship Building) 
• To conduct vulnerability and risk assessments for critical infrastructure, 
sensitive facilities, and community assets.  (Target Hardening) 
• To develop school security plans and coordinate emergency drills.  
(Community Safety) 
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• To develop and conduct community terrorism-awareness training sessions 
with residents, school personnel, businesses and other community 
stakeholders.  (Terrorism Awareness) 
• To supplement federal and state anti-terrorism task forces as necessary. 
Force Multiplier)  
• To supplement the efforts of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
officers as necessary.  (Force Multiplier)  
• To supplement the efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard as necessary. (Force 
Multiplier)  
• To attend and conduct homeland security and anti-terrorism training 
sessions.  (Economized Training)  
• To serve as a department’s homeland security trainer by passing on newly 
learned skills and information to other members of his or her department.  
(Economized Training) 
• To conduct site familiarity training at schools and critical infrastructure for 
patrol officers and other first-responders in the community.  (Community 
and Officer Safety) 
• To maintain the department’s homeland security database and related 
intelligence.  (Intelligence Function)  
• To be responsible for all homeland security grant and funding requests. 
(Financial Function)  
Municipal homeland security officers are much more than terrorism investigators 
or information points-of-contact.  They are a community’s homeland security experts. 
Their responsibilities span the entire spectrum of homeland security and terrorism duties, 
and they are a local community’s immediate protection against terrorism and catastrophic 
accidents.  They are the nation’s primary source of intelligence identifiers, collectors and 
disseminators as they fulfill their responsibility of protecting the citizenry through the 
establishment of collaborative homeland security partnerships.  MHSOs are the 
community policing officers of the future. 
C. COMMUNITY HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICERS (CHSOS) 
Protecting a community from terrorism and catastrophic accident is too 
cumbersome a task for just one person, therefore the MHSS is built upon a collaborative 
framework that integrates all homeland security assets into the strategy.  A key 
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component of the strategy is local government.  Through the MHSS design, mayors and 
administrators are incorporated into the strategy at the MHSP level.  The strategy calls 
upon each municipality to appoint at least one person from the administration’s staff as a 
community homeland security officer (CHSO.) 
The CHSO is the administration’s point-of contact to the MHSP and other federal 
and state homeland security entities.  The CHSO is able to provide the MHSP a 
government based perspective that is able to utilize the influences and authority available 
to local government.   
For example, CHSOs ensure that new high-profile construction projects take into 
account issues such as security, protective and evacuation measures in project design.  
Blast resistant building materials, security lighting, parking lot design, evacuation 
considerations, duel-use buildings and many other homeland security-related issues can 
be brought to the table by CHSOs.   
CHSOs and MHSOs work collaboratively with businesses to curtail dangerous 
business practices from occurring in the community.  Practices such as driving liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) trucks on city streets while school children are bused is just one 
example where a CHSO and MHSOs can collaboratively to secure the community.  In 
some instances, private business may not be willing to curtail a particular business 
practice upon the request of a MHSO.  This is where the CHSO can work with a business 
and offer tax concessions or other incentives to gain the business’ compliance.  
Another area where the CHSO can have positive effect on the MHSP is in the 
area of funding.  A number of federal and state funding issues can be researched and 
addressed at the administration level.  Building projects, highway and road developments, 
emergency shelters and power concerns are all issues that directly affect the citizenry and 





D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The MHSS creates two community-level homeland security positions (MHSOs 
and CHSOs) and tasks these individuals with the responsibility of securing the 
community from terrorism and catastrophic accident.  These officers are committed to 
creating innovative protection methodologies that secure a community’s infrastructure, 
public buildings, private businesses, schools, high-rise apartment buildings, ports, 
railways, major events, hospitals, roadways and neighborhoods.  These officers are 
focused on prevention, not response, as they provide municipal homeland security.  
MHSOs and CHSOs combine their unique abilities and resources to ensure that every 
possible asset is utilized to construct a comprehensive protection plan for their 
communities.  MHSOs are the community policing officers of the future and CHSOs are 
the political arm of municipal homeland security that ensures local communities have 
voices in the political spectrum.  
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VIII.  MUNICIPAL HOMELAND SECURITY NETWORK (MHSN) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Once appointed, MHSOs are organized into collaborative, regionally-based 
intelligence networks dedicated to serving not only a specific community, but entire 
geographic regions.  These networks are called Municipal Homeland Security Networks 
(MHSNs).  They are constructed with a flat organizational design that considers each 
member to be an equal and valued partner.  The size and composition of each network 
will vary according to the number of police departments and resources within a particular 
region.     
MHSNs are comprised of MHSOs, federal agents, state police officers, 
intelligence and military personnel, fire and health officials, and select community 
members - such as managers of critical infrastructures.  These individuals work 
collaboratively, at the local level, to secure their region against terrorism and the crimes 
that support terrorism. 
The purpose of the MHSN is to accomplish much more than just share 
information, its purpose is to regionalize homeland security intelligence efforts.  The 
network facilitates the efficient sharing of information, intelligence, case materials, ideas, 
prevention strategies, and technologies across regions.  The 9/11 Commission noted the 
following in its final report: “We propose that information be shared horizontally, across 
new networks that transcend individual agencies.”77  LHSNs accomplish this objective; 
they share information while remaining open to any agency that can contribute positively.  
These networks are based on the local district attorney’s jurisdiction and dedicated to 
homeland security and terrorism-related criminal intelligence matters.  They do not 
address non-homeland security-related crimes.  By integrating the local district attorney’s  
 
 
                                                 
77 9/11 Commission Report, 418. 
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office into the strategy, MHSNs unify the criminal intelligence efforts of entire 
jurisdictions and incorporate the prosecutorial arm of local government into the fight 
against terrorism.   
As information, intelligence, case materials, ideas and prevention strategies are 
exchanged via the network, efficiency increases, as does America’s ability to protect 
herself.  Through these collaborative, preventative-based networks, the knowledge of one 
agency becomes the knowledge of all agencies.  All this is accomplished at a minimum 
expense to individual police departments.   
Even MHSO training sessions will take place through the network.  The 
Department of Homeland Security – or any other federal entity – can quickly and 
efficiently conduct terrorism or security-related training sessions with network personnel.  
Entire geographic areas can be brought-up-to-speed on intelligence matters, terrorism 
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The Municipal Homeland Security Network mirrors the jurisdiction of the local district attorney and will 
vary in size and complexity.  Some MHSNs will be comprised of numerous MHSOs, federal agents, and 
other civilian participants, and therefore, will be larger and more complex.   
Figure 9.   A Synergistic Approach to Homeland Security  
Municipal homeland security networks create collaborative partnerships where 
trained homeland security professionals (MHSOs) meet, exchange ideas, work together 
and develop region-wide preventative plans and intelligence priorities.  Once established, 
MHSNs become the central component of this nation’s domestic intelligence collection 
and homeland security strategy.  
The MHSN meets at least monthly to discuss information and intelligence 
collected within the participating communities of the network.  Along with MHSNs, 
federal agents, state police officers assigned to homeland security, U.S. Attorney and 
fusion center personnel attend the meetings and provide homeland security-related  
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information that originated somewhere outside the network’s collective jurisdiction.  This 
ensures that trends and indicators garnered from the national or international areas are 
transferred to municipal networks. 
In addition, network personnel come together to discuss ways there are protecting 
their individual communities. This way each MHSO learns from the other.  For example, 
one community may identify a vulnerability to its water supply, which in turn prompts 
the next community to investigate its water supply security further.  Federal agents and 
fusion center analysts learn from the experiences of MHSOs and then relay that 
information to others outside the network.  This caliber of exchange does not take place 
in a virtual community or through an e-mail list to an “anti-terrorism” point of contact, as 
is the practice with the TLO Program.   
Municipal homeland security networks:  
• Serve as this nation’s primary domestic information and intelligence 
network.  The MHSN is organized regionally and works to secure not only 
a single municipality, but entire regions.  
• Proactively identify community and regional vulnerabilities and develop 
plans to address those vulnerabilities.  Proactive prevention is the mantra 
of MHSNs – not response.   
• Proactively identify, collect, analyze and disseminate homeland security 
and terrorism-related information and intelligence. 
• Ensure intelligence is processed through the intelligence cycle in a timely 
manner.  
• Ensure that suspicious incident and terrorism-related data is disseminated 
across the entire region, state and country.   
• Develop Regional Intelligence Plans (RTPs).  Regional intelligence plans 
describe the intelligence priorities for a specific region and focus the 
intelligence efforts of the MHSN.   
• Assist in developing risk and vulnerability assessments and security plans 
for critical infrastructure. 
• Provide outreach partners for fusion center personnel.  Fusion centers send 
staff personnel (especially analysts) to attend MHSN meetings.  
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• Develop strategies that address terrorism and crimes that support 
terrorism.  Along with the local district attorney, crimes that support 
terrorism are addressed on a regional level.   
• Facilitate federal and state-level intelligence and terrorism cases.  Federal 
and state agencies utilize the MHSNs to collect, receive and disseminate 
information and intelligence.  
• Develop and implement community and regional terrorism-awareness 
campaigns.  
• Receive and provide homeland-security training. 
• Meet at least once each month or more often if necessary.  
Municipal homeland security networks do not: 
• Address regional emergency response or all hazard issues.  Response is 
left to emergency responders and other emergency service agencies.  
• Analyze homeland security or intelligence information.  Analyzing 
information is the responsibility of the supporting fusion center.  MHSNs 
review, share and disseminate collected information – they are not 
analysis networks.  
• Operate independently from the supporting fusion center.  MHSN and 
fusion center personnel work collaboratively to identify regional 
intelligence priorities.  The supporting fusion center is considered a key 
component of the Network.  
In America, there is no strategy or program that proposes such a municipality-
based intelligence entity.  In 1996, the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department in California 
created a similar intelligence entity entitled Terrorism Early Warning Groups (TEWGs).  
These entities operated on “six integrated cells that create a system for processing 
incoming data through analysis by each of the cells, then synthesis of their individual 
evaluation to form an overall picture”78  The primary problem with TEWGs is that they 
operated as regional fusion centers staffed with members of different law enforcement 
agencies.  Individual municipal police agencies do not have the staffing or funding to 
support a complex analysis center.  Personnel, computers and a host of other expenses are 
associated with intelligence fusion centers, these cost are too prohibitive for municipal 
police agencies.  In addition, the TEWG design is more akin to fusing information than 
                                                 
78 Michael Grossman, Perception or Fact: Measuring the Effectiveness of the Terrorism Early 
Warning (TEW) Group (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2005). 
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serving as a region’s domestic intelligence collection and dissemination agency.  
Subsequently, the state of California has not adopted and broadened the TEWG concept 
state wide.  Instead, California now funds Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers 
(RTTACs) and State Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers (STTACs). 
B. REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PLANS     
Every municipal homeland security network produces and implements a Regional 
Intelligence Plan (RIP) and a Regional Technology Plan (RTP).  These documents focus 
and guide the collective efforts of municipal homeland security officers and other 
network participants by identifying the intelligence priorities and the technological needs 
of a MHSN.   
These two documents are not devised by any one member of the MHSN, or by a 
particular homeland security entity, but rather by the collective efforts of the entire 
MHSN.  No two regional intelligence and technology plans will be exactly alike.  Each 
plan takes into account a jurisdiction’s particular vulnerabilities, infrastructure, 
population, business composition, criminal activity and proximity to adjacent 
vulnerabilities.  Each plan also examines the suspicious and homeland security-related 
incidents reported within or adjacent to the MHSN’s jurisdiction.  These documents are 
revised and updated according to the information and intelligence the MHSN receives 
and collects.  Any federal, state or local entity or person can contribute information or 
intelligence to the MHSN.  MHSNs are horizontal in both design and function – and truly 
collaborative.  
The Department of Homeland Security – or other homeland security, intelligence 
or military entity – can issue mass bulletins (classified and non-classified) to every 
MHSN across the country, or bulletins can be restricted to a specific MHSN.  Instead of 
bulletins being sent to a police department (a building) – where few people are likely to 
see or hear about a bulletin’s contents – bulletins are sent to people (MHSOs) who are in 
the position to immediately act upon the information provided.  Through the MHSN, 
information is exchanged in an extremely timely and efficient manner. 
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1.     Regional Information Plans (RIPs) 
In the United States, there is no formal domestic intelligence methodology 
constructed with a bottom-up approach to intelligence collection.  Municipal police 
departments perform homeland security, terrorism and suspicious incident information 
and intelligence collection in a haphazard, serendipitous manner that is inconsistent, 
counterproductive and detrimental to the overall intelligence function.  Simply stated, 
there is no systematic, collaborative or comprehensive method to collect homeland 
security-related intelligence in America today.     
Mark Lowenthal, author of Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, states, 
“Collection is the bedrock of intelligence”79 and “Without collection, intelligence is little 
more than guesswork - perhaps educated guesswork, but guesswork nonetheless.”80  
Municipal homeland security networks and the regional intelligence plans they develop 
are designed to take the guesswork out of domestic intelligence collection.  Regional 
intelligence plans articulate the specific objectives and priorities of a network’s 
intelligence collection strategy.  MHSOs decide together, and sometimes are advised, 
what information and intelligence to look for, when to look for it, and in many 
circumstances, how to look for it.   
Essentially, regional intelligence plans are designed to guide the collective efforts 
of a MHSN.  As a MHSN receives or collects information and intelligence, members of 
the MHSN review the data (along with members of the nearest fusion center), determine 
its utility to their region, and then collectively build and implement a regional intelligence 
plan.  The supporting fusion center conducts a full analysis of the data.  The intelligence 
priorities for a particular region are collectively designed, fused with other pieces of 
information and intelligence, and then distributed across the entire network.   
 
                                                 
79 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence (CQ Press, Washington, D.C., 2006), 68. 
80 Ibid., 68. 
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Information and intelligence travels upon pre-established lines of communication, 
is shared with every member of the network, and every department in the MHSN receives 
exactly the same information and intelligence.  This ensures that every police department 
within the network is on equal footing and completely aware of what is transpiring within 
its geographical area.  
One MHSN may decide to concentrate its collective efforts on suspicious 
incidents in the maritime arena, while another may concentrate on crimes that support 
terrorism.  In these examples, the intelligence plan is different for each region as it 
addresses the particular needs of that network – but all plans support domestic 
intelligence collection. 
2 Regional Technology Plans (RTPs) 
Regional technology plans are designed to assist municipal homeland security 
networks to identify, purchase, distribute, manage and implement homeland security 
technologies.  Each RTP is specifically designed for a particular region and therefore 
must focus on that region’s unique vulnerabilities.  RTPs are interoperable with 
neighboring RTPs, offering an element of redundancy to a region’s security as 
technologies are shared among MHSPs. 
Because technological advances take place so quickly, regional technology plans 
focus on applications rather than technologies.  “In other words, make your technology 
plan outcome-based, not input-based.  Develop a plan that specifies what police officers, 
staff, and administration should be able to do with the technology and let those outcomes 
determine the types and amount of technology your plan requests.”81  Regional 
technology plans are outcome based, focusing on preventing, detecting and investigating 
terrorism.  Therefore, in most instances, police departments in the network will not 
receive the same technologies.  One MHSP may have a need for a sensor network while 
another MHSP requires surveillance cameras.  Rarely will every police department in the 
network receive the same equipment – except in the area of communication.  By focusing 
                                                 
81 John See, http://nctp.com/john.see.html (accessed November 17, 2008). 
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on outcomes we maintain alignment between technology and the network’s mission.  
“But we want it done in such a way that the dollars are distributed according to a plan. 
We have 18,000 municipalities in the United States. We've got 3,000 counties and 
parishes, 50 states and four territories. And if everybody goes charging out to the 
Congress in Washington, D.C. and says, give us a little money, we want to do this, this 
and that, we will not have a seamless national system. We have to build basic capacity 
around this country.”82  RTPs build capacity across entire regions, while maximizing 
technological and human resources. 
3.     Developing Regional Technology Plans 
The first step toward developing a regional technology plan is to identify the 
vulnerabilities in each community within the MHSN’s region.  This is accomplished 
when MHSOs go into their communities and meet with community stakeholders such as 
managers of critical infrastructures, hospital and school administrators, power and gas 
company representatives, building managers and state officials. 
Together, MHSOs and community stakeholders form “assessment teams” as they 
conduct security and risk-based assessments of their community’s infrastructure and 
sensitive facilities.  Assessment teams are comprised of the facility’s top administrator, 
selected facility personnel (both management and general staff), and state and city 
officials.  Anyone who has knowledge of a particular facility, procedure or process 
should be included.  The purpose is to conduct a team assessment of the facility, identify 
vulnerabilities, and then prioritize those vulnerabilities.  Once the vulnerabilities are 
prioritized, the assessment team then determines which vulnerabilities can be corrected 
by non-technical measures and which vulnerabilities will require the application of 
technologies from outside the facility.  Some vulnerability can be corrected without 
technological intervention; a modification to a facility’s policy or operating procedures is  
 
 
                                                 
82 Remarks By Homeland Security Director Thomas Ridge to Pennsylvania First Responders, January 
3, 2003, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0080.shtm (December 16, 2008). 
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often all that is required.  In order for the RTP to be effective, every MHSO in the 
network must conduct security and risk-based assessments in his or her community.  
Without this foundational effort, RTPs cannot effectively manage technology. 
Once the MHSOs have prioritized their community’s particular vulnerabilities 
those findings are brought before the MHSN.  As a group, the MHSN prioritizes the 
jurisdiction’s vulnerabilities and determines which vulnerabilities must be immediately 
addressed by the network.  Network members then work together and determine which 
technologies will eliminate or seriously reduce the most critical vulnerabilities. The 
MHSN then submits a grant application to the Department of Homeland Security or their 
respective state agency.  
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states, “A government has no 
higher obligation than to protect the lives and livelihoods of its citizens.” 83  I assert that 
municipal police departments have no higher obligation.  But how does the municipal law 
enforcement community meet this important obligation if there is no municipal level 
entity responsible for identifying community vulnerabilities and actively collecting 
homeland security-related information?  Besides a few part-time terrorism liaison 
officers, the majority of municipal police agencies in America do not have anyone 
assigned to this important function.  
How can we find transnational and domestic terrorists in our communities if there 
is no systematic strategy to locate them?  Are Americans relying on municipal police to 
find something they are not even looking for?  The continued reliance on serendipitous, 
chance encounters is dangerous and not effective at fulfilling America’s intelligence 
needs.  To compound this problem, fusion centers are receiving the majority of 
information and intelligence from federal agencies.  This top-down “feeding tube”  
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approach to domestic intelligence serves only to accentuate the federal intelligence 
system.  Essentially, fusion centers have become extended components of the federal 
government.  
The municipal homeland security network corrects these national and state 
wrongs by creating regionally organized networks of dedicated homeland security experts 
at the local level.  In the MHSN, domestic intelligence collection is decidedly flat in 
design and non-hierarchal.  Through this approach, all of America’s homeland security 
assets collaborate and work together with a common purpose.  Presently, no other 
national, state or local strategy facilitates such collaboration. 
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IX.  STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION AND CONCLUSION 
A.     STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 
Municipal homeland security and the strategies described in this paper are new to 
many in America.  Whenever a new strategy, idea or concept is introduced it is likely to 
receive some level of pushback, especially when the strategy encompasses an entire 
profession – or, as in this case, an entire level of law enforcement.  There will always be 
those who oppose a new idea and prefer to cling to familiar ways.  Usually, people in this 
category remain firm in their beliefs until they fully understand (or are shown) the 
importance of the new idea and the significant effect it has on their world.  When aircraft 
carriers were first introduced, many in the Navy believed they were wasteful and 
unnecessary.  Today, nearly everyone recognizes the significant role aircraft carriers have 
played in world history.   
During the strategic planning process, strategy formulators must identify strategic 
challenges and potential obstacles.  In the realm of municipal homeland security, there 
are three primary challenges that demand our attention: (1) the entrenched beliefs of the 
police culture and the continued unwillingness of the municipal law enforcement 
community to adopt homeland security as a core mission; (2) the declining financial 
environment at the municipal level; and (3) the distinct lack of homeland security-related 
guidance from the federal government to municipal police agencies.    
By identifying the potential challenges a strategy is likely to confront, we are able 
to construct strategy implementation measures that either mitigate or dissolve these 
impediments before we reach a critical juncture in the implementation process.  By 
preparing in this fashion, we increase our chances of success while simultaneously reduce 
the likelihood of failure.  Essentially, we manage the issues before the issues manage us.  
The identification of strategic challenges is a vital component of strategic planning.   
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Implementation of the municipal homeland security strategy (MHSS) begins with 
a direct assault on the ruinous falsehood that homeland security is not a core municipal 
police mission.  Municipal police executives must be shown how their communities’ – 
and broader America’s – security is directly linked to the level of municipal police 
involvement in this nation’s homeland security efforts.  One method of accomplishing 
this task is to educate police executives on the emerging and dynamic aspects of 
terrorism.  Professional organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police and the Police Executive Research Forum can facilitate this change.  
Understanding terrorism is the first step toward preventing it.  
The federal government can influence municipal police culture and reduce false 
perceptions by incorporating more municipal police officers into federal-level terrorism 
investigations.  We must not restrict the involvement of the municipal law enforcement 
community in America’s terrorism investigations to those few municipal officers who are 
assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces.   
One method of increasing municipal police involvement in federal investigations 
is through the utilization of MHSOs.  Federal agencies must consider MHSOs as force 
multipliers and utilize these homeland security assets more often to help investigate 
terrorism leads and cases.   
Another method to ensure that federal, state and local police agencies operate on 
the same intelligence continuum is to incorporate the municipal law enforcement 
community (as collectors) into America’s intelligence community.  This can best be 
accomplished through the routine utilization of MHSOs and MHSNs by federal agencies.   
Strategy implementation can also be facilitated by providing the municipal law 
enforcement community with specific homeland security-related expectations.  Police 
executives must know how their agencies are expected to integrate into federal and state 
homeland security strategy.  They must know specifically what is expected of them in the 
areas of homeland security, counterterrorism and intelligence collection.  The 
expectations must be measurable, realistic and widely recognized.  Today, the majority of 
police executives do not know what homeland security role to fulfill.  Not knowing the 
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standard reinforces the status quo and fosters increased inaction.  In turn, inaction 
reinforces the status quo.  As the cycle repeats itself, the nation becomes more 
vulnerable.   
In his book, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide 
to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement, John Bryson asserts there 
are “general guidelines”84 for strategy implementation.  
According to Bryson, the first step is to “Consciously and deliberately plan and 
manage implementation in a strategic way.”85  Here, strategic planning is the key to 
implementation.  Strategy implementers must plan how a strategy will be implemented.  
“Implementation therefore must be explicitly considered prior to the implementation step, 
as a way of minimizing later implementation difficulties, and it must be explicitly 
considered and planned for during the implementation step itself.”86   
Relative to the MHSN strategy, implementation strategies must be collaboratively 
designed by all stakeholders: federal, state and local government representatives, law 
enforcement executives from all levels, political leaders, and members of professional 
organizations such as the IACP and PERF.  By incorporating key stakeholders buy-in is 
fostered across the widest possible participant spectrum.  Once buy-in is achieved, 
implementation will proceed more flawlessly.     
Next, Bryson states that “implementation strategy documents and action plans” 87 
should be utilized to guide the implementation process.  In this regard, strategy 
implementers must ensure that specific implementation steps are clearly articulated to all 
participants.  There must be schedules, timelines, implementation milestones and other 
measuring instruments that catalog the implementation process.   
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Implementation of the MHSN strategy becomes tangible when police executives 
name someone on staff as a municipal homeland security officer (MHSO).  MHSNs 
cannot be formed until municipal police departments in the local district attorney’s 
jurisdiction have someone on staff dedicated to the homeland security mission.  The 
identification of MHSOs is a critical milestone toward strategy implementation.  Another 
milestone is providing the MHSN with a clearly defined mission statement, performance 
objectives and evaluative criteria.  These measures provide the contextual framework that 
link vision to objectives and serve as implementing strategies.   
Training is a performance measure that is applied to the MHSS strategy.  MHSOs 
must be trained in homeland security related topics such as terrorism awareness, 
surveillance and counter-surveillance techniques, improvised explosive device 
recognition, chemical detection, name recognition, immigration law and many other 
areas.  Once MHSOs are trained by federal agencies, they in turn become trainers for 
their respective police departments.  This training is cost efficient because it is conducted 
with the entire MHSN during the normal business day of MHSO.  In most cases there 
will be no overtime associated with the training.  Trainers can train an entire region of a 
state in one session.  This approach ensures the consistency of knowledge and procedure 
throughout the MHSNs collective jurisdiction.  One of the most beneficial aspects of 
training entire MHSNs at once is that MHSOs can discuss the utility of the training with 
other MHSOs while at the training session.  This allows MHSOs to see how other 
jurisdictions will apply the training, plan coordination, and thereby, better secure their 
own jurisdiction.  
Training is an effective performance measure for implementation because training 
can be measured and cataloged for every MHSO and MHSN.  The MHSN serves as the 
homeland security training forum for America’s domestic intelligence collectors.   
Bryson also asserts that implementers should strive to first introduce changes that 
can be “easily and rapidly”88 implemented.  Accordingly, strategy implementers must 
first concentrate on small successes before attempting to implement more substantive 
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changes.  By introducing the strategy in increments, rather than en masse, acceptance of 
the MHSS is less abrupt to the municipal police community.  Instead, of being perceived 
as a federal directive, the strategy is seen as a ground-up approach to protect the local 
community.     
Therefore, the first success MHSS implementers should strive to achieve is the 
creation of a nation-wide support base for the strategy.  Implementers must seek out those 
police leaders who support the homeland security mission and have created their own 
homeland security programs.  Contained within these two groups is the largest pre-
existing and untapped assemblage of strategy support.  This support must first be mined; 
then it must be converted into a support-building mechanism that further expands the 
support base.  As support for the strategy grows, implementers focus on achieving more 
significant successes and solidifying the implementation process.   
Creating buy-in with local district attorneys is another strategy goal.  Many local 
district attorneys are elected officials.  As an elected official, district attorneys are always 
looking for new techniques to help them apprehend criminals, protect citizens, and reduce 
fear in the community.  The MHSS accomplishes all of these goals.  In addition, the 
MHSS places the local district attorney in a key leadership position in the network; 
always a good position to be in – especially if you are a politician.   
Once buy-in is created with police executives and district attorneys, MHSOs will 
be appointed in the majority of police departments.  Subsequently, MHSNs will form.  As 
MHSNs form, information, intelligence and ideas are readily exchanged; relationships 
build and collaborative partnerships develop; municipal police departments will be 
incorporated into the intelligence cycle; and MHSN members will begin to work as a 
team.   
As the popularity and importance of the MHSS becomes nationally recognized, 
the federal government should restructure homeland security funding procedures to 
mandate MHSN development.  Regionalization is already a federal requirement for 
homeland security grant requests.  The MHSS builds upon the regionalization concept by 
encouraging law enforcement, homeland security, intelligence, military and civilian 
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entities to participate in collaborative networks.  The MHSS is the only homeland 
security and intelligence collection strategy that brings all of America’s homeland 
security assets together at the local level.     
The MHSS will not be implemented without experiencing pushback, strategic 
challenges and political pressures from those who have their own agendas.  However, the 
implementation process can be made simpler if support for the strategy is garnered at the 
outset from the municipal law enforcement community and other key participants.  
Presently, in the United States, there is no nationally recognized intelligence collection 
strategy that integrates the municipal law enforcement community into the intelligence 
community like the MHSS.  Therefore, vetting the strategy across homeland security 
disciplines and building a support base for the strategy is critically important to 
implementation success.  Yes, the municipal police community is looking for direction 
from the federal government, but it’s not looking for a federally mandated strategy that 
removes operational control from the municipal level.  Therefore, the best chance of 
implementation success comes from building a wide base of support while 
simultaneously integrating the law enforcement community into America’s domestic 
security and intelligence communities. 
B.     CONCLUSION 
Instead of facing a few very dangerous adversaries, the United States 
confronts a number of less visible challenges that surpass the boundaries 
of traditional nation-states and call for quick, imaginative, and agile 
responses.89  
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states, “A government has no 
higher obligation than to protect the lives and livelihoods of its citizens.”90  I assert that 
municipal police departments have no higher obligation.  The municipal homeland 
security strategy helps both the federal government and municipal police leaders protect 
the local community from those who want to destroy it.  Municipal homeland security 
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should be mission one for all police executives, state governments, professional law 
enforcement agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security.  All other missions, for 
any of these entities, may be meaningful, but they are peripheral.   
Our current approach to homeland security is effective at addressing easily 
identifiable terrorist organizations, but ineffective at addressing emerging threats such as 
asymmetric transnational or domestic threats.  Terrorism is continuously evolving; 
therefore we must evolve at a faster rate, or we expose ourselves to unimaginable 
dangers.  Yesterday is different from today, and so is tomorrow.  Either we create a 
flexible and truly synergistic homeland security strategy, or we continue to rely on the 
status quo and hope a federal agency gathers the necessary intelligence to stop an attack 
before it takes place.  As General Gordon Sullivan, former Chief of Staff of the Army, 
stated, “Hope is not a method.”91  Hope is certainly not a good method, but it seems to be 
the method we’re operating on today.  
The municipal homeland security strategy presented in this thesis is based on 
collaboration and prevention.  It is dedicated to protecting the local community by 
creating partnerships with agencies and people who have a homeland security role.  It is 
dynamic and flexible, and able to adapt to any changing or emerging threat.  This strategy 
recognizes that municipal homeland security officers are the intelligence collectors of 
today, and the community policing officers of the future.  Most importantly, the 
municipal homeland security strategy puts the onus of community protection right where 
it should be – at the municipal police level.   
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